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FOR EWORD
This is one of a set of seven reports, each one describing the
results, for a particular subsystem, of a study titled "An Engineering
Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques. " Under the general title of
"A Guide to Onboard Checkout," the reports are as follows.
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Section 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 OBJECTIVE
With the advent of large scale aerospace systems, designers have recognized
the importance of specifying and meeting design requirements additional to the
classical functional and environmental requirements. These "additional" require-
ments include producibility, safety, reliability, quality, and maintainability.
These criteria have been identified, grown into prominence, and become disciplines
in their own right. Presently, it is inconceivable that any aerospace system/
equipment design requirements would be formulated without consideration of
these criteria.
The complexity, sophistication and duration of future manned space missions
demand that still another criterion needs to be considered in the formulation of
system/equipment requirements. The concept of "checkoutability" denotes the
adaptability of a system, subsystem, or equipment to a controlled checkout pro-
cess. As with other requirements, it should also apply from the time of early
design concept formulation.
The results of "An Engineering Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques" and
other studies indicate that for an extended space mission onboard checkout is
mandatory and applicable to all subsystems of the space system. In order to use
it effectively, "checkoutability" should be incorporated into the design of each
subsystem, beginning with initial performance requirements.
Conferences with researchers, system engineers and subsystem specialists
in the course of the basic Onboard Checkout Techniques Study revealed an extensive
interest in the idea of autonomous onboard checkout. Designers are motivated to
incorporate "checkoutability" into their subsystem designs but express a need for
information and guidance that will enable them to do so efficiently.
It is the objective of this report to present the results of the basic study as
they relate to one space subsystem to serve as a guide, by example, to those who
in the future need to implement onboard checkout in a similar subsystem. It is not
practicable to formulate a firm set of instructions or recipes, because operational
requirements, which vary widely among systems, normally determine the check-
out philosophy. It is suggested that the reader study this report as a basis from
which to build his own approach to "checkoutability. "
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1.2 BASIC STUDY SUMMARY
1.2.1 STUDY OBJECTIVE
The basic study was aimed at identification and evaluation of techniques for
achieving the following capabilities in the operational Space Station/Base, under
control of the Data Management System (DMS), with minimal crew intervention.
* Automated failure prediction and detection
* Automated fault isolation
* Failure correction
* Onboard electronic maintenance
1.2. 2 STUDY BASELINE
The study started in July 1970. The system design baseline was established
by the Space Station Phase B study results as achieved by the McDonnell-Douglas/
IBM team, modified in accordance with technical direction from NASA-MSC. The
overall system configuration was the 33-foot diameter, four-deck, 12-man station.
Individual subsystem baseline descriptions are given in their respective "Guide to
Onboard Checkout" reports.
1.2.3 STUDY TASKS
The basic study comprised five tasks. Primary emphasis was given to
Task 1, Requirements Analysis and Concepts. This task established subsystem
baseline descriptions and then analyzed them to determine their reliability/main-
tainability characteristics (criticality, failure modes and effects, maintenance
concepts and line replaceable unit (LRU) definitions), checkout strategies, test
definitions, and definitions of stimuli and measurements. After software pre-
liminary designs were available, an analysis of checkout requirements on the DMS
was performed.
A software task was performed to determine the software requirements
dictated by the results of Task 1.
Task 3 was a study of onboard electronic maintenance requirements and
recommendations of concepts to satisfy them. Supporting research and technology
tasks leading to an onboard maintenance capability were identified. The study
implementation plan and recommendations for implementing results of the study
were developed in Task 4. The task final report also summarizes results of the
study in all technical tasks.
1-2
Reliability, Task 5, was very limited in scope, resulting in an analysis of
failure modes and effects in three Space Station subsystems, GN&C, DMS (computer
group) and RF communications.
1.2.4 PREVIOUS REPORTS
Results of the basic study were reported by task in the following reports,
under the general title of "An Engineering Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques,
Final Report. "
IBM Number Title
71W-00111
71W-00112
71W-00113
71W-00114
71W-00115
Task 1: Requirements Analysis and Concepts
Task 2: Software
Task 3: Onboard Maintenance
Task 4: Summary and Recommendations
Task 5: Subsystem Level Failure Modes and
Effects
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Section 2
BASELINE SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS
2.1 GENERAL
This section describes the baseline Data Management Subsystem (DMS) which
was analyzed to define onboard checkout requirements. In order to assess require-
ments for onboard checkout, descriptions at the subsystem level and the assembly
level are required, as well as the major interfaces between subsystems.
The assembly level description for each of the subsystems (MSFC-DRL-160,
Line Item 13) provided the primary working document for subsystem analysis. To
reduce documentation, these documents have been incorporated by reference into
this report, where applicable. Therefore, where no significant differences exist
from the Phase B definition, this report contains a brief subsystem description
and an identification of the referenced document containing the assembly level
descriptions for that subsystem. Where significant differences do exist, the sub-
system level description includes these changes in as much detail as is available.
MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 19, provided the major subsystem interface descrip-
tions for analysis of integrated test requirements.
2.2 SUBSYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION
The DMS consists of the necessary equipment to transfer, store, and process
data to and from users and subsystems. As such, it acquires and conditions a wide
variety of input data from experiments, vehicle subsystems sensors, uplinked
ground communications, and astronaut-activated controls.
Figure 2-1 depicts the DMS baseline configuration. Individual subsystem
descriptions are provided because of the differences between the study baseline
and the MDACABM Phase B configuration.
2-1
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The DMS Computer Subsystem is comprised of:
* One - Space Station Operations Multiprocessor (3 CPUs)
* One - Space Station Experiment Multiprocessor (3 CPUs)
* Shared Main and Auxiliary Memories
* Bulk Data Storage
* Switching Matrices
Figure 2-2 depicts a functional block diagram for the Computer Subsystem.
A lower level functional diagram of the individual Computer Subsystem com-
ponents is given in Figure 2-3.
The six processors (CPUs! are identical in size and architecture and can
provide a backup capability for one another. The main memory (256 K words)
and the auxiliary memory (2.5 M words) are shared between all the CPUs and
can be individually addressed through the memory switch matrix, by any of the
six CPUs. These memories will be primarily used for the storage of subroutines
and data that require rapid access from the CPUs. In addition, these memories
can be addressed directly from the data bus for direct storage of uplinked pro-
gram modifications and acquired data. The main memories are high speed mono-
lithic memory units and the auxiliary memories are a combination of high speed
magnetic tape, incremental tape, and magnetic disc units.
The bulk data storage uses ultra high density magnetic tape recorders and
is configured to meet large data volume storage requirements with a relatively
slow access speed. Its use is primarily for recording digital data before onboard
processing or before return to earth for ground processing. As such, it will be
the last level of memory in the Processing Subsystem and will store infrequently
used information not requiring rapid access, such as maintenance procedures,
spare parts inventories, or information that may be stored off line. The bulk
data storage consists of the following elements:
* Tape Transports
* Tape Transport Controllers
* Digital Buffer and Control _Unit_
· Record/Reproduce Electronics
* Switching Matrices
2-3
DATA BUS
NOTES:
P = PRIMARY DATA BUS LINES
S = SECONDARY DATA BUS LINES
Figure 2-2. DMS Computer Subsystem
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The Data Acquisition and Distribution Subsystem is comprised of the following
elements:
* Data Bus
* Digital Data Bus Terminals
* Remote Data Acquisition Units
* Local Monitor and Display Units (LMDU)
This subsystem is used by the DMS to distribute all necessary commands and
acquire all required data or command responses for Space Station operation,
experiment control/monitoring, and for all OCS functions. Additionally, the
data bus is used for the distribution of all intercommunication and entertainment
audio and video signals.
The data bus consists of redundant coaxial command and response lines
(4 total) linking together all primary elements of the DMS. A total data rate
greater than 50 megabits per second should be considered for this application.
Twisted wire pairs or other suitable transmission lines are used for secondary
data distribution common to individual data bus terminals and transmission of
warning alarm signals to and from LMDUs.
The digital data bus terminals are configured for modularity and interface
commonality. This terminal is designed to handle eight standard four-wire
interfaces each with individual bit rates of 1 MHz or less. Each interface is
isolated to prevent propagating a data source failure to another interface. A
switchable modem is used as the data bus interface. The switching feature per-
mits the modem to interchange its command and response lines such that an off-
line data dump to a selected subsystem (i. e., bulk data storage) can be effected
with the stated data bus configuration (i. e., separate command and response
lines). Clock logic is modular and divides the data bus clock to the frequencies
required by the subsystem/experiment interfaces. Buffer storage is also modular
and may be provided for any or all inputs individually. This feature allows storage
to be tailored to a particular interface data rate. The DMS control would effi-
ciently utilize this storage by (1) sending a control word to cause the terminal to
sample its inputs, and at a later time (2) sending a control word to request a data
dump. An additional interface is provided to address the stimuli generators and
other required discrete signal outputs. The terminal would be used, via a DMS
control word, to energize a particular stimuli generator channel, or provide a
control function (discrete signal) output. A self-check feature is provided to allow
OCS fault isolation to a particular unit.
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The Remote Data Acquisition Unit can be considered as a subsystem/ex-
periment preprocessor and is designed to interface directly with the digital data
bus terminal. The RDAU performs five functions on analog and digital signals.
These are: signal conditioning, multiplexing, A/D conversion (analog only), limit
checking, and digitizing to format the data into the standard digital format for
transmission to the data bus. Signal conditioning is accomplished through a pro-
grammable gain amplifier or both programmable gain amplifier and a precon-
ditioning (ahead of the multiplexer) network. The RDAU inputs may be discrete
(on-off) or analog signals, but must be preconditioned to the proper working vol-
tage prior to multiplexing. The A/D converter output is digitally compared with
high and low limits extracted from a self-contained read/write memory. If the
measured parameter exceeds either limit, the return data is flagged so the DMS
processor is aware of any failures or out-of-tolerance conditions. The limits can
be changed and adjusted to changing operational conditions by appropriate com-
mands from the DMS/OCS processors.
Operation of the RDAU is under direct control of the DMS processor which
transmits control information via the data bus using a standard word format con-
taining the address of the RDAU and the appropriate instruction codes. Three
operating modes are provided as described below.
* Compare Mode - The device sequentially scans the input channels and
compares the digitized measurements with upper and low limits stored
in the device memory. No action is taken unless an out-of-limit con-
dition is detected, in which case an error message is formatted for
transmission to the DMS processor. The stored limit values may be
changed at any time under processor control. Individual channels may
also be inhibited from generating error messages. These capabilities
allow the limit check profile of each RDAU to be adjusted to accom-
modate changing operating modes or conditions of the equipment.
* Sequential Output - The device sequentially scans the input channels
and transmits the digitized measurements to the processor. Limit
checking is inhibited.
* Single Channel Output - The device selects a single input channel whose
address is specified in the control word and transmits the digitized
value to the processor. The channel may be sampled once or re-
petitively. Limit checking is inhibited.
RDAU inputs may be either discrete (on-off) or analog signals, but must
be preconditioned to a specified voltage range. The baseline configuration
accepts discrete inputs of 0 or 5 Vdc and analog inputs in four ranges of 0-20 mV,
0-50 mV, 0-100 mV, and 0-5V. Other voltage levels may be accommodated if
2-7
required, at the expense of additional signal conditioning circuitry in the device.
It should be pointed out, however, that the ability to accommodate the development
and evolutionary growth expected to occur in the Space Station dictates the necessity
to establish standard interface specifications which do not impose unreasonable
constraints on either the Data Acquisition System or the data sources. Precon-
ditioning of data at the source satisfies this requirement by providing an easily
definable interface which is compatible with established instrumentation practices.
The RDAU basic configuration is a device with 32 analog and 32 discrete channels.
Other configurations of varied capability are also provided to attain an optimum
distribution. The RDAU contains a self-test capability to allow fault isolation to
the replaceable unit. A possible self-test concept is to provide calibration vol-
tages, divided from the RDAU power input, into the input of the multiplexer.
This would give an indication as to the operational status of the unit.
The LMDU, shown in Figure 2-4, is primarily an RDAU with local critical
parameter display capability. It accepts both caution and warning functions and
contains the necessary circuitry to: (1) monitor these critical functions continu-
ously for out-of-tolerance conditions, (2) cause immediate activation of self-
contained and external alarm indications, and (3) acquire caution and warning
function data for normal checkout operations. Limit checking of critical function
inputs is performed using the same methods and circuitry employed by the RDAU.
Unlike the RDAU, however, the LMDU activates local alarms which are directly
wired to the monitor circuitry. Transmission of critical function data to the cen-
tral caution and warning displays is on the DMS data bus. In contrast to caution
parameter limits, which can be changed by remote control, the stored limits for
warning parameters are adjustable only by local manual replacement of individual
memory modules. Detection of out-of-limit warning function activates audio and
visual alarms located within the unit and, under CPU control, those located exter-
nal to the unit. These include alarms in the Space Station's primary and secondary
control centers, and as required in other LMDUs. Once initiated, caution and
warning alarms remain active until reset. A capability is provided for selectively
inhibiting individual functions to accommodate changing operational conditions.
All critical functions are also redundantly monitored via the normal DMS/OCS.
The Space Station caution and warning function is considered a part of the
OCS, but is implemented as a separate and redundant system for reliability.
Critical measurements are monitored and out-of-tolerance indications are pro-
vided primarily through the use of Local Monitor and Display Units. Warning
functions are those which, if out of tolerance, could present an immediate threat
to crew life. Caution functions are those which, if out of tolerance, could result
in major degradation of Space Station performance unless specific crew action is
taken.
2-8
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A functional block diagram of the caution and warning function is shown in
Figure 2-5. The redundancy of the monitoring elements can easily be seen from
this diagram. Detection of an out-of-tolerance condition causes the activiation of
both visual and audible alarms to notify the crew. Annunciator panels and LMDUs
with appropriate displays are located in each crew compartment, where required,
and on the central command and control consoles. The displays are coded (by
color, tone, etc. ) to differentiate between the caution and warning levels of alarm.
A manual override is provided for the audible alarm.
The Image Processing Subsystem, as shown in Figure 2-6, provides onboard
capability to:
* Provide quick look at experiment results
* Calibrate/align experiment instruments
* Monitor and control experiments
The Image Processing Subsystem is configured to process 1923 images per
8 hours, image content 2. 5 x 106 bits each. The digital computer associated with
this subsystem has tentatively been defined as the DMS Experiment Multiprocessor
and is intended to be used for statistical evaluation of image data as well as de-
rivation of annotation information. Requirements for Fourier transformations
and convolution processing, in respect to additional special purpose digital pro-
cessing equipment, are being analyzed.
An experimenter's station is provided which consists of an experimenter's
console and display. The console communicates with the experiments it controls
and with the computer and analog processor (adjustable multichannel filter). Each
station display will have two CRTs for comparing images driven by the working
video storage or by the computer.
The central element of the system is the Experimenter's Console which
contains displays for film and image information generated in analog form. The
functions controlled from the console include:
* Adjustment of viewing instruments
* Annotations and editing functions for stored, processed, and
transmitted image information
* Control of processing functions in an interactive manner
2-10
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Film may be directly viewed using the film viewer/reader. This device,
which provides for single-and multiple-frame analysis, consists of a screen for
viewing or scanning, controls for image magnification and rotation, and a frame
counter.
The film scanner is employed to transform film images into an electrical
signal. For this purpose, the unit employs a high resolution flying spot scanner
which may be programmed to vary the electronic sweeps and scans of the unit in
order to reduce nonlinearities or obtain data only on particular areas of interest.
The Command/Control and Display Subsystem (CCDS) is comprised of the
following basic elements.
* Operations CCDS Center
* Experiment CCDS Center
* Portable Display and Control Units
These units provide the primary human interface to the DMS/OCS.
The Operations CCDS Center will be the primary central command post for
Space Station operations. This station provides monitoring and control capability
of all subsystem "housekeeping" activities, mission planning, and personnel/ac-
tivities scheduling. This station will play a central, active role during all rendez-
vous and docking phases with other spacecraft and experimental modules and during
ground communications for command and data transfer.
The Experiment CCDS Center is a centralized operation center for monitor-
ing and management of the experiment program. In addition, this station is capa-
ble of providing emergency/backup vehicle and subsystem control capability in the
event the crew is forced to evacuate the Primary Command and Control Center
because of a major emergency condition. Because of this, the Experiment CCDS
Center is located in an environmentally isolatable compartment.
Displays and controls required at the experiment/Secondary Command and
Control Center are basically the same as those required by the primary center,
in addition to dedicated experiment displays and controls to permit complete mon-
itoring and control capability over the experiment program.
In addition to the primary and backup control centers, a number of small
portable devices are provided which contain alphanumeric displays and input key-
boards. These devices may be plugged into the data bus at various locations
throughout the Space Station and thereby provide an operator with limited control
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and display capability from remote locations. An example of their use would be in
certain fault isolation situations where the operator finds it advantageous to oper-
ate from a position adjacent to the equipment under test rather than from the cen-
ter location.
The command/control and display stations, Figure 2-7, contain three multi-
purpose CRT display devices (one primarily allocated to OCS functions) and two
keyboards which provide backup redundancy. This dual design allows onboard
checkout to be accomplished from this station by a second crew member on a non-
interference basis while sharing common displays, readouts, status lights, etc.,
if necessary. Some special OCS peculiar displays such as status indicators, as
well as special purpose OCS controls such as mode and function switches, are in-
tegrated into the console in such a way as to permit access by the OCS operator
without interference with other console operations. The prime interface for dis-
plays and controls to the Space Station is through the DMS multiprocessor com-
puter via the data bus. The prime control/display devices providing the interface
with the computer are mode select switches, computer keyboard unit, and multi-
purpose CRT displays. The keyboard and associated mode select pushbutton
switches provide access to and control of nonprogrammed computer operations
and the CRT displays computer-generated alphanumeric/graphic information and
stored/processed data. A secondary "hardwire" interface is provided for those
functions, such as local controls and dedicated displays, which are wired directly
and do not require transmission via the data bus. Intercom and Command Control
Television (CCTV) control is provided by the Command/Control and Display Console
(CCDC) via analog interface units.
The GN&C preprocessors are included within the DMS only to the extent of
their interconnection with the data bus through required data bus terminals. Five
preprocessors and associated data bus terminals have been configured for the
GN&C Subsystem. These preprocessors provide the capability of operationally
interfacing the individual GN&C sensors and controls via required interface elec-
tronic assemblies to the operations multiprocessor. In addition, it is anticipated
that a significant amount of data formatting and "housekeeping" computations will
be accomplished by these preprocessors, thereby relieving the overall operations
multiprocessor load. Specific assignments of data formatting and computation to
the individual GN&C preprocessors have yet to be determined.
It is assumed that the preprocessors will be simplex, dedicated digital
computers with a self-test capability. Specific signal conditioning for inputs and
outputs to the GN&C sensors and controls will be accomplished by the interface
electronics assemblies, a part of the Guidance, Navigation, and Control System.
The preprocessor-to-data-bus interface will be through a standard data bus
terminal.
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2.3 ASSEMBLY LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS
Subsystem block diagrams and descriptions of the Data Management Sub-
system assemblies not included here are provided in the Space Station MSFC-
DRL-160, Line Item 13, Volume I, Book 2, Space Station Electronics. These
descriptions include block diagrams, discussion of major subassemblies, physical
characteristics, and interface descriptions. DRL 13, Volume I, Book 2, is in-
corporated by reference into this report as a detailed description of the DMS as-
semblies and, except where modified by this document, will become the primary
working document for further analysis.
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Section 3
RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSES
3.1 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
As a guide to emphasis in subsequent checkout technique studies, an analysis
has been made of the overall subsystem and major component criticality (failure
probability) of the Space Station subsystems and equipment. As an input to the
Checkout Requirements Analysis Task, this data along with the failure mode and
effects data will be useful in determining test priorities and test scheduling.
Additionally, this data will aid in optimizing checkout system design to ensure
that confidence of failure detection is increased in proportion to added system
complexity and cost.
3.1.1 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
A criticality number (related to failure probability) was generated for each
major subsystem component. This number is the product of: (1) the component
failure rate (or the reciprocal of mean-time-between-failure), (2) the component's
anticipated usage or duty cycle, and (3) an orbital time period of six months, or
4, 380 hours. Six months was chosen as the time period of interest to allow one
missed resupply on the basis of normal resupply occurring at three-month intervals.
The criticality number, then, is the failure expectation for a particular component
over any six-month time period.
For visibility, the major components of each subsystem analyzed have been
ordered according to the magnitude of their criticality numbers. This number,
however, should not be considered as an indication of the real risk involved, since
it does not take into account such factors as redundant components, subsystem
maintainability, and the alternate operational procedures available.
Overall subsystem criticality has been determined by a computerized
optimization process whereby spares and redundancy are considered in terms of
a trade-off between increased reliability and weight. This determination, there-
fore, reflects not only the failure probability of subsystem components, but also
the probability that a spare or redundant component may not be available to
restore the subsystem to operational status. The methodology used is described
in Section 9, Long-Life Assurance Study Results, DRL 13 (Preliminary Subsystem
Design Data), Volume III (Supporting Analyses), Book 4 (Safety/Long Life/Test
Philosophy) from the MIDAC Phase B Space Station Study. Component-level failure
mode and criticality data are presented in subsequent paragraphs.
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3.1.2 SUBSYSTEM CRITICALITY DATA
The Data Management Subsystem has a six-month reliability of 0. 998. This
figure is based upon the currently projected potential reliabilities of the compon-
ents (some of which are in the early development stage), critical failure definitions
based upon preliminary DMS functional definitions, and adequate sparing. Criti-
cality numbers for units which are internally redundant cannot be established at
this time since the actual values will depend upon detail design. No single failure
or credible combination of failures can cause loss of the major DMS functions.
Table 3-1 provides the ordered ranking of DMS components.
3.2 FAILURE EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FEA)
The procedure employed in this section is similar to that of the earlier FEA
analysis, except that a distinction was made between "single" and "multiple"
failures. The term "multiple failures" implies complete loss of the function under
consideration. A description of the baseline subsystems is contained in Section 2.
Generally, this FEA, coupled with other results, indicates that no failure
modes exist which invalidate the onboard checkout concepts. It is noted that this
analysis was conducted at the component level, commensurate with available Space
Station subsystem design definition.
Examples of results of the Data Management (DMS) subsystem FEA are given
in Table 3-2 (a partial listing).
3.3 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT ANALYSIS
General maintenance concepts and recommendations are summarized in
Section 7. The maintenance concepts provide guidelines to definition of Line
Replaceable Units.
3.4 LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT ANALYSIS
General guidelines and criteria for the definition of LRUs were established
and these along with the maintenance philosophies reported in Section 3-3 were
used to determine at what level line maintenance would be performed. For the
Space Station Data Management Subsystem, a functional partitioning of the major
subsystem components based on the ability to create a viable isolation method to
that functional level was performed. The "functional LRUs" were then considered
in the light of the standard electronic packaging scheme and actual LRUs were
defined and listed. The method employed and the results achieved are discussed
for both cases in the following sections.
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3. 4. 1 SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEMS
From the baseline DMS, the LRUs were defined and partitioned from the
physical and functional considerations relative to each respective subsystem.
3. 4. 1. 1 Functional Partitioning
Primary selection was generally on the basis of functional fault isolation
capabilities. An approach was taken (Section 6. 1, Volume II of Final Report,
Task 1) whereby automatic (OCS) or semiautomatic (OCS/manual) methods could
be employed to diagnose and isolate subsystem faults to a reasonable functional
level. This functional level was chosen on the basis of experience and familiarity
with the subsystem. The approaches presented in Section 6. 1 could be expanded
to greater levels of detail, even to the individual piece part level, but the require-
ments in terms of hardware and software necessary to implement these would
increase exponentially. A reasonable rationale for the determination of the level
of functional partitioning was defined as that functional level which is required for
the intended normal operation of the subsystem without the necessity for consider-
able built-in test circuitry. Some functional LRUs defined herein include a degree
of self-check capability. This was found to be required in terms of implementing
the functional diagnostic/isolation approach derived without postulating additional
separate "test boxes."
3. 4. 1. 2 Physical Partitioning
Consideration was also given to the physical aspects of LRU definitions, in
terms of the standard electronic book module defined in DRL 13, Volume I, Book
2. It appears that such a module, or a basic group of several modules, would be
an ideal LRU in respect to replacement, logistics, ease of handling, etc., con-
siderations. Indications are that a majority of the LRUs presented herein could
be packaged in one or more "basic" modules. The Remote Data Acquisition Unit
(RDAU) and Local Monitor and Display Unit (LMDU) electronics appear to be the
smallest defined LRUs and would probably be packaged two to a basic module.
These assessments are based on initial unit power estimates and module capabilities
in addition to a "subjective" sizing of the circuitry required for a particular function.
In the Command/Control and Display Consoles (CCDC), consideration was given to
the packaging aspects of the control and display assemblies. These assemblies
would be treated as separate LRUs, along with all their associated electronic
circuitry. Due to the peculiar nature (keyboards, display lights, etc.) of these
assemblies in respect to a "basic" module, they would be packaged as separate
removable units. This would greatly enhance the isolation and maintainability of
th-ese assemblies.
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3. 4. 1. 3 Functional LRU Definition
In order to define a workable fault diagnostic/isolation scheme certain hard-
ware requirements and subsystem functional diagrams were postulated. These
requirements and functional diagrams are reasonable, in view of present and future
technology, and are in concert with the overall baseline DMS philosophy. A
detailed description of certain of these functional elements can be found in Section
3 "Baseline Subsystem Descriptions. " The other functional elements are described
in DRL 13, Volume I, Book 2, Space Station Electronics.
3. 4. 1. 3. 1 Computer Subsystem
The overall Computer Subsystem is comprised of the following functional
elements:
* Operations Multiprocessor
* Experiment Multiprocessor
* Shared Memories
* Bulk Data Storage
The multiprocessor elements can be further broken down into the following
elements, each of which is considered a functional LRU:
* Data Bus Controller (DBC) - A device, not unlike a data bus terminal,
which is used by the DMS/OCS multiprocessors to issue commands to
and receive data from the data bus.
* Switch Matrices - These are multiple channel switching circuit com-
plexes which are completely transparent to any coding scheme.
* Input/Output Circuitry - These are multiple channel interface circuits
which perform parity checks on all incoming data.
* Logic and Control Circuitry - This is the main arithmetic-control
element of the CPU.
* Dedicated Memory - This is a memory which is peculiar to a given
CPU. It cannot be addressed directly from any other DMS/OCS element.
It is a high speed rapid access element which is used to store the
immediate operating and executive routines for that CPU.
* Power Supply and Distribution - This power source provides all
required operating power for the I/O, logic and control, and dedicated
memory.
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The shared memories, main and auxiliary, can be broken down to a lower
level of isolation (LRU definition) by supplementing the automatic diagnostics
described in Section 6. 1 of the Task 1 Final Report with manual procedures.
The following replaceable elements should be considered as actual LRUs.
* Electronics section - Contains I/O, logic, control circuitry, etc.
* Mechanical section (where applicable) - Contains disk drives, tape
transports, etc.
* Memory element - Contains solid-state memory, disks, magnetic tape
reels, etc.
* Power section - Contains power supplies, distribution, etc.
The bulk data storage elements can be further broken down into the following
elements, each of which is considered a functional LRU:
* Digital Buffer and Control (DBC) - This unit provides the input/output
and control functions for the bulk data storage facility. It decodes
commands from the CPU and sets up the proper write/read channels
through the various switch matrices.
* Record/Reproduce Electronics (R/R) - This element is a multichannel,
switchable write/read unit. It conditions the data for transferral to and
from the magnetic tape storage medium.
* Switch Matrices - These are multiple-channel switching circuit com-
plexes which route signals (data or control) to appropriate hardware
elements.
· Tape Transport Controller (TC) - These are the control circuits for the
individual tape transports. They provide all the required read/write tape
control under command from the DBC.
· Tape Transports (TT) - These are the magnetic tape drives. The tape
drive motors and associated electromechanical elements comprise these
units.
* Power Supply and Distribution - These units provide all the required
power for the bulk data storage facility, with the exception of the DBT.
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3.4. 1.3.2 Data Acquisition
The Data Acquisition Subsystem is comprised of the following elements,
each of which is considered a functional LRU.
It should be noted that the sensor assembly and the function under test are
integral parts of the subsystem/experiment group and as such are not considered
as data acquisition elements.
* Data Bus Terminal (DBT) - A device used to interface various sub-
systems and experiments (including RDAU and LMDU) to the data bus.
* Remote Data Acquisition Unit (RDAU) - This unit accepts analog and
discrete inputs from various subsystems/experiments, converts these
input to digital data, and interfaces directly with a data bus terminal.
e Stimuli Generation Unit (SGU) - This device, upon command from a data
bus terminal, provides different calibrated signals (stimuli) to various
subsystems/experiments. This is the only unit which is used primarily
for diagnostic purposes.
3.4.1.3.3 Command/Control and Display
The Command/Control and Display Console (CCDC) is comprised of the
following assemblies:
· Alphanumeric Display Assembly - Display for computer-generated
digital data.
· Status Light Assembly - Display for computer-generated digital data.
Used to indicate operational conditions.
* Dedicated Displays - Contingency displays hardwired to appropriate
subsystems/experiments.
* Command Buffer and Control Unit - Provides control for the digital
multiplexer in addition to buffering all the commands from the CCDC
control panels. Contains a self-test feature.
* Digital Multiplexer - Combines all the CCDC control commands for
inputting to the Command Buffer and Control.
* Hand Controller Assembly - Used for providing continuously variable
human input information to the computer. Used in conjunction with the
Mode Select Switches.
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I* Mode Select Switch Assembly - Used to establish the logic that
determines the function of the multifunction pushbuttons.
* Multifunction Switch Assembly - Provides for the single selection
of a group of commands.
* Monofunction Switch Assembly - Provides for the selection of
individual commands.
* Computer Keyboard Assembly - Used for directing computer
operations or modifying/correcting existing software routines.
These assemblies can be further broken down into the following elements
which are considered as functional LRUs.
* Display Control and Buffer Unit - Provides control for the Display
Switch Matrix in addition to buffering all display data to the CCDC.
· Display Switch Matrix - A multichannel switching matrix which routes
display data to the appropriate displays.
* Refresh Buffer - Provides the necessary storage capability for the
CRT displays.
* Display Control - Provides the primary control of what is being
displayed on the CRTs. Can select between digital data or analog
information for display. Control of video/Command Control television
(CCTV) on the CRT displays is provided by this function.
* CRT Display Assembly - An integral unit containing the CRT and all
necessary video control functions.
· Warning Annunciator Assembly - Contains an integral audio alarm
along with all required visual displays for critical warning function
alarming.
* Caution Display Assembly - Display for all critical caution functions.
* Discrete Controls - Contingency controls hardwired to appropriate
subsystems/experiments.
· Microfilm Viewer Assembly - This unit provides the means to view
stored microfilms.
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q* Microfilm Viewer Control - Provides the required control for micro-
film retrieval and viewing.
* Microfilm File - Microfilm storage.
* Analog Interface Unit - This unit provides the capability for analog
information (CCTV video, intercom audio, etc. ) to be transferred to
and from the CCDC. It interfaces the data bus with the CCDC circuitry.
* Channel Select and Analog Control - This unit provides the channel
selection capability for CCTV and intercom distribution in addition to
providing control for all CCDC analog functions.
* CCTV Panel Assembly - Primary setup and control point for all
Space Station CCTV distribution.
· Intercom Control Panel - Primary setup and control point for all
Space Station intercom distribution.
* Audio Tape Assembly - Audio tape control and deck assembly.
* Video Tape Assembly - Video tape control and deck assembly.
* Illumination Control Assembly - Provides Space Station ambient light
control in addition to CCDC panel illumination and lamp test capabilities.
* CCDC Power Supplies - These units provide all the required power for
the CCDC. An overall power system rationale has yet to be developed.
The Portable Display and Control Unit (PDCU) is comprised of the following
elements all of which are considered functional LRUs.
* Display Assembly - Contains the refresh buffer, CRT display control,
and CRT display assembly
* Computer Keyboard Assembly
* Optional Pluggable Features
- Hand controller assembly
- Multifunction switch assembly
* Power Supply - Provides all required power for the PDCU
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3.4.1. 3.4 Image Processing
The Image Processing Subsystem is comprised of the following elements,
which are considered functional LRUs.
* Display Control - Provides the primary control of what is being
displayed on the CRTs.
* CRT Display Assembly
* Film Viewer - Provides the capability to manually view processed
films. Consists of a screen for viewing or scanning, controls, and
frame counter.
* Film Scanner - Transforms film images into electrical analog signals.
* Image Digitizer - Converts analog signals from the film scanner and
vidicon outputs into digital data.
* Adjustable Multichannel Filter - Provides the analog processing
capability. The working analog storage function is an integral part
of this unit.
* Permanent Analog Storage - Provides tape recording capability for
the storage of analog data.
* Analog Control Assembly - Provides all the required control for the
operation of the adjustable multichannel filter, display control, and
permanent analog storage in respect to analog image data.
* Digital Control Assembly - Provides all the required control for the
various digital components in the subsystem.
· Working Digital Storage - Provides a rapid access storage capability
for digital information via the digital control assembly or the Data
Bus Terminal.
* Permanent Digital Storage - Provides tape recording capability for
the storage of digital data.
* Display Conversion - Used to convert digital data received from the
computer into analog signals for viewing on the CRTs.
e Annotation and Editing Assemblies - Provides the capability for annota-
ting and editing processed film, digitized images, or analog information.
Specific hardware requirements for these functions have yet to be defined.
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3.4.1.3.5 GN&C Preprocessors
A typical functional diagram for the GN&C preprocessors is shown in
Figure 3-1. This figure is intended to be representative of the five GN&C pre-
processors. These GN&C preprocessor elements are simplex dedicated digital
computers with self-test capability, and are considered functional LRUs.
3.4.1.4 LRU Definition
The LRUs defined in this section are listed in Table 3-3 by their respective
subsystems and are a result of the degree in which a software/hardware system
(OCS) can effectively isolate malfunctioning elements (see Section 5) in addition to
the physical considerations of packaging and accessibility within a given equipment
complex.
/ DMS
GN&C INTERFACE I
SENSORS ELECTRONIC
ASSEMBLY
GN&C DATA BUS
PREPROCESSOR TERMINAL
DATA BUS
.·SEBL A I U
\ \
Figure 3-1. GN&C Preprocessor Typical Functional Diagram
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Table 3-3. Data Management Subsystem
Item Quantity
Computer Subsystem
Data Bus Controller 2
Data Bus Switch Matrix 2
Memory Switch Matrix 2
Data Bus I/O 2
Shared Memory I/O 2
CPU Logic and Control 6
Dedicated Memory 6
CPU Power Supply 6
Shared Memory Electronics Section 2
Shared Memory Mechanical Assembly 2
Memory Elements 16
Shared Memory Power Supply 2
Bulk Data Storage
Digital Buffer and Control 4
Record/Reproduce Electronics Assembly 4
Transport Switch Matrix 4
Controller Switch Matrix 4
Tape Transports 4
Tape Transport Controllers 4
Bulk Data Storage Power Supply 4
Data Acquisition
Data Bus Terminal 30
RDAU (or LMDU) 250
Stimuli Generation Unit 40
Command/Controls and Display
Display Control and Buffer 2
Display Switch Matrix 2
Refresh Buffer 2
Display Control 2
CRT Display Assembly 2
Warning Annunciator Assembly 2
Caution Display Assembly 2
Alphanumeric Display Assembly 2
Status Light Assembly 2
Dedicated Displays 2
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Table 3-3. Data Management Subsystem (Continued)
Item Quantity
Command Buffers and Control 2
Digital Multiplexer 2
Hand Controller Assembly 2
Computer Keyboard Assembly 2
Mode Select Switch Assembly 2
Multifunction Switch Assembly 2
Monofunction Switch Assembly 2
Discrete Controls 2
Microfilm Viewer Assembly 2
Microfilm Viewer Control and File 2
Analog Interface Unit 2
Channel Select and Analog Control 2
CCTV Panel Assembly 2
Intercom Control Panel Assembly 2
Audio Tape Assembly 2
Video Tape Assembly 2
Illumination Control Assembly 2
CCDC Power Supplies 2
Portable Display and Control Units
Display Assembly 4
Computer Keyboard Assembly 4
Optional Pluggable Functions 4
Power Supply 4
Image Processing
Display Control 1
CRT Display Assembly 1
Film Scanner 1
Film Viewer 1
Image Digitizer 1
Adjustable Multichannel Filter 1
Permanent Digital Storage 1
Working Digital Storage 1
Permanent Analog Storage 1
Digital Control Assembly 1
Analog Control Assembly 1
Display Conversion 1
Annotation and Editing 1
GN&C Preprocessors
GN&C Preprocessor 5
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Section 4
OCS CHECKOUT STRATEGIES
4.1 SUBSYSTEM CHECKOUT STRATEGY
Prior to any further requirements analysis, it is necessary to develop a
checkout strategy for all Space Station subsystems to meet the checkout objectives
of the Space Station OCS. The objectives of the Space Station OCS can be
summarized as follows:
* To increase crew and equipment safety by providing an immediate
indication of out-of-tolerance conditions
* To improve system availability and long-life subsystems assurancy
by expediting maintenance tasks and increasing the probability
that systems will function when needed
* To provide flexibility to accommodate changes and growth in both
hardware and software
* To minimize development and operational risks
Specific mission or vehicle-related objectives which can be imposed upon
subsystem level equipment and subsystem responsibilities include the following:
* OCS should be largely autonomous of ground control.
* Crew participation in routine checkout functions should be minimized.
* The design should be modular in both hardware and software to
accommodate growth and changes.
* OCS should be integrated with, or have design commonality with,
other onboard hardware or software.
* The OCS should use a standard hardware interface with equipment
under test to facilitate the transfer of data and to make the system
responsive to changes.
*e Failures- -shoulid be isolated to an LRU such that the faulty unit can be
quickly removed and replaced with an operational unit.
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* A Caution and Warning System should be provided to facilitate crew
warning and automatic "safing" where required.
* Provisions must be included to select and transmit any part or all of
the OCS test data points to the ground.
To attain these objectives via the use of an Onboard Checkout System which
is integrated with the Data Management System, checkout strategies have been
developed which are tailored to each Space Station subsystem.
Special emphasis has been applied to a strategy for checkout of redundant
elements peculiar to each subsystem. The degree to which each of these functions
is integrated into the DMS is also addressed.
4.1.1 SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEMS
Each major Space Station subsystem was examined with respect to the re-
quired checkout functions. The checkout functions associated with each subsystem
are identified and analyzed as to their impact on the onboard checkout task. The
functions considered are those necessary to verify operational status, detect and
isolate faults, and to verify proper operation following fault correction. Specific
functional requirements considered include stimulus generation, sensing, signal
conditioning, limit checking, trend analysis, and fault isolation.
4. 1. 1. 1 Data Management Subsystem (DMS)
The testing of the DMS will involve principally a series of software programs
designed to exercise the DMS group in a normal subsystem configuration. If there
is a failure in one of the units, the OCS must isolate the failure, reconfigure the
DMS Subsystem to restore normal operation, alert the crew of the failure and its
location, and record the event. Given that a unit has been replaced, the OCS must
maintain knowledge of the operational status of the new unit.
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Within the DMS, each functional unit must be tested. This means that there
must be at least CPU type tests, main store tests, bulk memory tests, bus con-
troller tests, etc. Since there exists more than one path to perform certain
functions in the subsystem configuration, it is important to verify that intercom-
munications among units also exists. This requirement gives rise to interface
tests. Some of the interfaces which exist include CPU-to-CPU, CPU to both
main and bulk memories, CPU to primary and secondary bus controllers, bus
controllers to terminals, terminals and RDAUs, and RDAUs to individual sub-
systems. The fact that the many communication paths are possible generates
the requirement that a path must be switchable or alterable to restore operation.
Determining which path must be altered indicates that a fault isolation capability
also must exist. Fault isolation may occur by commanding tests to various equip-
ment in a sequence such that the analysis of the pattern of responses logically
leads to a faulty piece of equipment. The maintenance of continuous knowledge
of the operational status of the equipment can be translated into the requirement
to maintain a subsystem status table (or configuration table) in software. If the
operator is to be involved in any actions, interactive crew/display/software tests
are required.
4.1.1. 1. 1 DMS Test Methods
The DMS checkout will consist principally of software diagnostics supple-
mented with additional temperature, voltage, and logic measurements.
* Central Processing Units - Error detection and isolation in the central
processing units depend on diagnostic software. In the multiprocessing
configuration, one central processor can be utilized to check another
central processor. This can be accomplished through memory or
through a direct interface. In addition, parity checking can be imple-
mented between interfaces of the central processor with other units.
* Main Store Units - The main store units can be checked periodically
by attempting to address all locations in each unit, performing ripple
tests, sum checks, etc. BITE capabilities in the form of parity check-
ing will occur on data read from storage and data presented by the
central processors. Parity checking will be the principal means of
error detection.
* Data Bus Controller - The data bus controller is the communication
path between memory and central processor and the data bus. Verify-
ing operation of the controller can be implemented by software diagnos-
tics. BITE hardware can be incorporated, which upon command from
the CPU, inserts a known serial data word (pattern) into the input side
of the controller and transmits the word back to the CPU. The CPU
can compare the response to the command word.
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* Digital Data Terminals - The digital data terminal interfaces the various
subsystems/experiments and the data bus. The terminal can be tested
much like the bus controllers. A self-check feature in the form of
BITE can be added which routes calibrated signals through the unit to
the CPU (via the data bus) for verification.
* RDAU - The RDAU can be tested in the same manner as the bus con-
trollers and data terminals. The RDAU contains 32 analog inputs and
32 digital inputs. One input of each type can be reserved to wrap around
an analog or digital signal into the input for return to the CPU. The
CPU would command the test voltage or signal and examine the response
for known conditions.
* Local Monitor and Display Unit (LMDU) - The LMDU electronics will
be checked in an identical manner to the RDAU. The displays will re-
quire crew participation.
* Command and Display Consoles - The controls and displays associated
with the consoles are subjected to a form of continuous test through
normal use. For the displays, standard test patterns containing all
the symbols and numerics presented to the crew will verify operation
of display and symbol generation. The controls are exercised through
the normal equipment utilization.
* Image Processing - Tests for the image processing equipment will
consist primarily of supply voltage and analog measurements for which
an interface via an RDAU should be provided to the DMS computer.
Optical equipment is tested through normal use. Integral diagnostics
should be included with the special purpose processors such that the
diagnostics can be commanded from the DMS computer.
* Bulk Storage - The basic operation of bulk memory can be verified by
writing-reading random length records of predefined data patterns
and checking the response for correctness. The basic capabilities of
writing, sensing, reading forward and backward, I/O test, and control
will be verified via this technique. Error detection through parity
checking also will be performed throughout the test.
* GN&C Preprocessor - Built-in test equipment is assumed to be applic-
able. Since the preprocessors are not yet defined, the form of BITE
is yet to be determined.
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* OCS Measurements - In addition to the software diagnostics and BITE
provisions which can be incorporated into the OCS, a series of measure-
ments must be made on certain equipment. Some of the units may be
temperature sensitive, which will generate a requirement to monitor the
temperature. Most of the units also will contain an integral power supply
or converter which must be monitored. There also may be certain logic
which must be monitored.
The measurements which are required fall into three categories.
These include:
a. Analog
b. Digital/discrete
c. Visual
The analog measurements will consist primarily of temperature and power
supply voltages. The digital or discrete signals will be checked through software
analysis of state or patterns. Visual inspections could be a visual analysis of a
display, a pulse train or pulse shape - visual inspection may be more appropriate
in performing adjustments, but it represents a form of measurement which may
be required.
4.1.1..12 OCS Computer Program Segments
The operational and maintenance requirements indicate that two levels of
testing or test control are required. Depending on the type of test being exercised,
different information will be extracted and different actions will result from the
testing. Two major sets of computer programs have been identified to perform
this testing. Within each program there are several modules required to extract
the desired information. The two test levels identified which translate into com-
puter programs include:
* Continuous orbital monitoring (COM)
· Subsystem Fault Isolation (SFI)
The continuous orbital monitoring program is required to maintain cogni-
zance of equipment's operational status at all times and to isolate failures in
order to reconfigure the equipment. The continuous monitoring program can be
hardware or software. The hardware can consist of Caution and Warning or of a
machine check interrupt from parity error or power transients. The software
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program would consist of a set of test programs performed iteratively and con-
currently with the application programs. The test programs would be interleaved
with the application programs, and performed at a rate determined by the
executive. The subsystem fault isolation program would be designed to perform
more extensive testing than would be performed in the "continuous" program.
4.1.1.1. 3 Test Program Modules
Each of the two major program sets will contain several modules to per-
form specified functions. These are discussed in the following paragraphs.
4.1.1.1. 3.1 Continuous Orbital Monitoring Program Modules
The continuous orbital monitoring modules will consist of the DMS test
programs (e. g., CPU, memory addressing, I/O operation, etc. ), the polling of
test points, and a Caution and Warning module.
* Test Program Modules - The test programs are designed to verify
operation of individual configurable elements. The rationale for this
is to maintain continuous configuration control, necessitating periodic
information regarding the operational status of all configurable ele-
ments comprising the DMS group. These test modules will be designed
to exercise as much of each LRU as possible in the allocated time. The
modules will confirm, for example, fundamental operations of the CPUs,
main memory, bus control, terminals, etc.
* Test Point Polling - The test point polling module is required to sample
voltages, temperatures, and logic patterns for out-of-tolerance con-
ditions or pattern errors. The test points can be handled singly or in
blocks.
* Caution and Warning - A Caution and Warning module is required to
monitor critical signals on a continuous basis. This module may be
implemented through selective parts of the two modules above; i. e.,
through execution of selective diagnostics or through the polling of
selective test points.
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4. 1. 1. 1. 3. 2 Subsystem Fault Isolation Modules
Listed below are candidate program modules which would comprise the
Subsystem Fault Isolation program. These change with regard to the number of
modules or because of a merging of responsibilities. The list includes:
(1) Failure verification/isolation modules
(2) Failure event analysis module
(3) Reconfiguration module
(4) Subsystem status table
(5) Display/Record/Telemetering Module
(6) Repair verification modules
* Fault Verification/Isolation Modules - Failure verification/isolation
modules are designed to resolve failures to the level at which re-
dundancy is applied (for reconfiguration purposes) and to the LRU level
to support the on-line remove-and-replace maintenance philosophy.
Subsequent to the detection of an error, anomaly, or failure, it may be
necessary to verify via an independent path, that an event has occurred
or that a particular path is disabled. This may be accomplished by
performing a separate routine or by correlating results from other
routines. The isolation modules will be executed in whatever sequence
is necessary to resolve the failure to a reconfigurable path.
* Failure Event Analysis Module - Failure event analysis modules are
designed to evaluate the event in terms of criticality, failure history,
active/inactive status, etc. Based on an FMEA, hazards studies, etc.,
failures can be classified into certain groupings; e. g., critical items,
time critical items, items involving crew actions, items automatically
switched through internal BITE, etc. When an event occurs, it is nec-
essary to evaluate the source of the event (whether OCS or LRE BITE),
the criticality of the function lost and whether the crew must be involved
in any subsequent actions, the redundant paths available and their
status with regard to power on/off, failure history, etc.
* Reconfiguration Modules - Reconfiguration modules are designed to
initiate and execute the sequence of operations necessary to reconfigure
the subsystem. Depending on the source of the failure, different pro-
cedures may be involved in reconfiguring the equipment. The recon-
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figuration can occur in software or it can be a physical switching of
redundant paths. These modules will be required to execute the unique
actions associated with each LRU, path, function, or subsystem.
* Subsystem Status Table - The subsystem status table is designed to
maintain the status of all DMS reconfigurable elements. To prevent
the switching or reconfiguring of faulty equipment, it is necessary to
maintain a subsystem status table of all equipment. In the event of a
failure, the subsystem status table must be analyzed with respect to
the failed element to determine if a redundant path is available. Sub-
sequent to the remove-and-replace of the faulty LRU and the successful
completion of an LRU test module, the subsystem status table would
be updated.
* Display/Record - Display/record is designed to provide interactive
display/control with the crew and to provide an event history file. In
order to provide prompting information and to provide interactive capa-
bilities between OCS and crew, display formats (or messages) containing
such information will be required. In addition, an event history should
be maintained for ground processing and analysis (logistics, provision-
ing, long term trend data, etc). The capability for telemetering any or
all test data also will require certain provisions.
* Repair Verification/Adjustment - The repair verification/adjustment
is designed to verify proper operation of LRUs subsequent to repair.
Special repair verification or adjustment modules may be required to
re-verify an LRU or to perform LRU adjustments. These tests may not
be as extensive as the failure verification/isolation modules, but could
contain certain segments of the diagnostic modules.
4.1. . 1. 4 Computer Program Top Level Flow
The Multiprocessor Executive System must provide certain times, on a
scheduled basis, during which DMS tests can be performed. iThe executive may or
may not subdivide the DMS tests depending on computer load at the time or on the
duration required to perform certain test sequences. Subsequent to DMS tests,
the experiment module tests or particular subsystem tests can be performed.
At specified intervals, the executive must return to the regular application
programs.
If during the DMS tests, a failure is detected, it must be resolved or isolated
to an LRU or to a data path that is reconfigurable. The output of the LRU and
interface tests is a system reconfiguration, display message to the crew, a re-
cording of the event, and an update of the subsystem status table.
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4.1.1.1. 5 DMS Redundant Element Checkout Techniques
The control of redundancy within the DMS will be a software function
principally and can be implemented through the LRU diagnostics within the Sub-
system Fault Isolation Program. The redundancy control function consists of
detecting errors or failures and isolation of the failure to a reconfigurable path.
The general case of redundancy control is considered initially.
An output from a single function is acquired by one of two RDAUs (one
designated as "prime" and the other as "secondary"). The RDAU will perform
some processing to the function and feed the information to its respective digital
data terminal. From the terminals, the data is fed to the computer via one of two
data bus controllers (again, one is designated as "prime" and one "secondary").
Control of redundancy within the computer will depend on diagnostic software.
Individual CPU diagnostics can be performed and cross checking of one CPU by
the other CPU is possible. Cross checks can be implemented through check
words in memory or through a direct control interface. If one CPU is determined
to be at fault, the other CPU can assume the load. With regard to memory, each
main store unit can be checked periodically by diagnostic software. BITE in the
form of parity checking will play a significant role in error detection and isolation
on data read from memory to the CPU or to the data bus controller.
The control of redundancy in the data acquisition path can be implemented by
the incorporation of BITE within data acquisition elements and through software.
Figure 4-1 shows a method of isolating and reconfiguring the data acquisition ele-
ments. If an out-of-tolerance event or failure indication occurs, it can be true or
it can be a false alarm. By performing an RDAU test, the RDAU can be absolved
of the responsibility or determined to be the source of the problem. If the RDAU
is faulty, the data point has an alternate path through the secondary RDAU. If
after performing the RDAU test (which indicated failure) the same indication pre-
vails through the secondary RDAU, the failure is between the RDAU and the CPU.
By alternately addressing data acquisition test command between primary and
secondary elements, a logical isolation and reconfiguration pattern can be developed
(as shown in Figure 4-1). This procedure would isolate to a replaceable unit.
Redundancy at the RDAU/sensor level for the baseline has three configur-
ations. The most critical signals (warning signals) have duplicate sensors and
two independent paths to the data bus. The next level signals (caution signals)
also have duplicate sensors and two paths to the data bus, but these paths are
somewhat different from those for the warning signals. The third level of signals
has a single sensor source, but has two separate RDAU paths to the OCS pro-
cessors. The redundant sensors and redundant paths afford point-to-point correl-
ation of data in the case of anomalies. In the case of warning signals, the data is
fed to the CCDC and data bus through an LMDU and to the bus through an RDAU
4-9
NO
ADDRESS SAME DATA
POINT THROUGH
SECONDARY RDAU
EXEC
YES
Figure 4-1. Data Acquisition Configuration Control
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DATA PATH
and terminal. If an out-of-tolerance indication exists, it is possible to address
the alternate source and verify the condition. This technique also makes heavy use
of software for configuration control.
4.2 INTEGRATED CHECKOUT STRATEGY
This analysis identifies the integrated checkout functions associated with
Space Station subsystems during the manned orbital phase of the mission. These
functions are depicted in Figure 4-2 and are those required to ensure overall
availability of the Space Station. Characteristic of integrated testing is the fact
that the test involves subsystem interfaces, and, therefore, test objectives are
associated with more than one subsystem.
4.2.1 INTEGRATED STRATEGY
Six checkout functions have been identified:
* Caution and warning
* Fault detection
* Trend analysis
* Operational status
* Periodic checkout
* Fault isolation
These functions represent a checkout strategy of continuous monitoring and
periodic testing with eventual fault isolation to a line replaceable unit (LRU).
Under this aspect the functions are grouped as -
CONTINUOUS MONITORING PERIODIC TESTING FAULT ISOLATION
* Caution and warning * Automatic tests · Localize to SS
* Fault detection * Operational * Isolate to RLU
* Trend analysis Verification
* Operational status
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General characteristics of these groups are defined below:
4.2.1.1 Continuous Monitoring
Continuous monitoring is not a test per se. It is a concept of continuously
sampling and evaluating key subsystem parameters for in/out-of-tolerance con-
ditions. This evaluation does not necessarily confirm that the subsystems have
failed or are operating properly. The evaluation is only indicative of the general
status of the subsystems. For example, a condition exists where the integrated sub-
systems are indicating in-limit conditions, but during the next series of attitude con-
trol commands, an error in Space Station position is sensed and displayed. Since
three subsystems, DMS, GN&C, and P/RCS, are involved in generating and
controlling the Space Station attitude, a "positional error" malfunction is not
directly related to a subsystem malfunction. The malfunction indication is only
indicative of an out-of-tolerance condition of an integrated function. Final resolu-
tion of the problem to a subsystem and eventually to LRU will require diagnostic
test-procedures that are separate from the continuous monitoring function.
There are situations in which the parameters being monitored are intended
to be directly indicative of the condition of a subsystem or an LRU. Examples of
these include tank pressures, bearing temperatures, and power source voltages.
However, even in these simpler cases when a malfunction is detected, an integrated
evaluation will be performed to ascertain that external control functions, transducers,
signal conditioning, and the DMS functions of data acquisition, transmission, and
computation are performing properly. This evaluation will result in either a sub-
stantiation of the malfunction or identification of a problem external to the param-
eter being monitored.
Figure 4-2 shows the logic associated with each function in the continuous
monitoring group, as well as the integrated relationships between these and the
total checkout functions. The caution/warning and fault detection functions are
alike in their automatic test and malfunction detection approaches, but are differ-
ent in terms of parameter criticality and malfunction reaction. The caution/warn-
ing function monitors parameters that are indicative of conditions critical to crew
or equipment safety. Parameters not meeting this criticality criteria are handled
as fault detection functions. Figure 4-2 shows that in the event of a critical mal-
function, automatic action is initiated to warn the crew and sequence the sub-
systems to a safe condition. Before this automatic action is taken, the subsystems
must be evaluated to ascertain that the failure indication is not a false alarm and
that the corrective action can be implemented. After the action is taken, the sub-
systems must be evaluated to determine that proper crew safety conditions exist.
Since automatic failure detection and switching can be integral to subsystem de-
sign (self-contained correction) and subsystems can be controlled by the operation-
al software or manual controls, it is imperative that the status of these events be
maintained and that the fault detection and correction software be interfaced with
the prime controlling software. For malfunctions that are not critical, the crew
is notified of their occurrence, but any subsequent action is initiated manually.
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The next continuous monitoring function, trend analysis, automatically ac-
quires data and analyzes the historical pattern to determine signal drift and the
need for unscheduled calibration. It also predicts faults and indicates the need
for diagnostic and fault isolation activities. An example of a parameter in this
category is the partial pressure of nitrogen. Nitrogen is used to establish the
proper total pressure of the Space Station. Since it is an inert gas, the only make-
up requirements are those demanded by leakage or airlock operation. The actual
nitrogen flow rate is measured, and calculations are performed which make
allowances for normal leakage and operational use. When these calculations
indicate a trend toward more than anticipated use, the crew is automatically
notified and testing is initiated to isolate the problem to the gas storage and
control equipment or to an excessive leak path. The historical data is not only
useful in predicting conditions but is also useful in providing trouble-shooting clues.
The data might reveal, for example, that the makeup rate increased significantly
after the use of an airlock. This could lead directly to verifying excessive seal
leakage.
The final continuous monitor function is in operational status. This function
is performed by the crew and is nonautomatic with kthe exception of the DMS com-
puter programs associated with normal Space Station operational control and
display functions. The concept of continuous monitoring recognized and takes
advantage of the crew's presence and judgment in evaluating Space Station per-
formance. In many instances the crew can discern between acceptable and un-
acceptable performance, and they can clearly recognize physically-damaged
equipment or abnormal conditions.
4. 2. 1. 2 Periodic Testing
As opposed to continuous monitoring, periodic testing is a detailed evalua-
tion of how well the Space Station subsystems are performing. Figure 4-2 shows
that periodic testing is not accomplished by any one technique. Rather, a com-
bination of operational and automatic test approaches is employed. The actual
operational use of equipment is often the best check of the performance of that
equipment. Operation of Space Station equipment and use of the normal operating
controls and displays will be used in detecting faults and degradation in the sub-
systems. This mode of testing is primarily limited to that equipment whose
performance characteristics are easily discernible, such as for motors, lighting
circuits, and alarm functions.
Automatic testing is performed in two basic modes:
* With the subsystems in an operating mode, the DMS executes a diagnos-
tic test procedure which verifies that integrated Space Station functions
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are being properly performed under normal interface conditions in
response to natural or designed stimulation. This mode of testing
allows the evaluation of Space Station performance without interrupting
mission operations.
* For those situations where the integrated performance or interface
compatibility between subsystems cannot be determined without known
references or control conditions, the DMS will execute a diagnostic
procedure in a test mode. In this mode, control, reference, or bias
signals will be switched in or superimposed on the subsystems to allow
an exact determination of their performance or localization of problem
between the interfaces. Since the test mode may temporarily inhibit
normal operations, the DMS must interleave the test and operational
software to maintain the Space Station in a known and safe configuration.
The scheduled automatic tests are performed to verify availability or proper
configuration of "on-line" subsystems, redundant equipment, and alternate modes.
* Periodic Verification of "On-Line" Subsystems - The first checkout
requirement is a periodic verification that on-line subsystems are
operating within acceptable performance margins. The acceptable
criteria for this evaluation is based on subsystem parameter limits and
characteristics exhibited during Space Station factory acceptance or
pre-flight testing. The rejection criteria and subsequent decision to
repair or reconfigure subsystems is based on the criticality of the
failure mode. If the subsystems appear to be operating properly, but
the test clearly indicates an out-of-tolerance condition, then one of the
following alternatives must be implemented:
- If the failure mode'is critical,: the crew normally takes immediate
action to isolate and clear the problem.
- If the failure mode is not critical, the crew can take immediate
action, schedule the work at a later time, or wait until the condi-
tion degrades to an unacceptable level.
* Redundant Equipment Verification - A second checkout requirement is
verifying that standby, off-line, or redundant equipment and associated
control and switching mechanisms are operable. The acceptable/re-
jection criteria for these evaluations is identical to those for normally
operating equipment. A primary distinction of this function is that
-equ-ipment- may-- ha-ve--known--fai-lur-es--fr-om- 
-previous -usage--or tests. This
situation occurs when the crew has knowledge of a failure but has not
elected to perform the necessary corrective action. The checkout
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function then becomes one of equipment status accounting and main-
tenance/repair scheduling. The status information is interlocked with
mission procedures and software to preclude activation of failed units
while they are being repaired or until proper operation following repair
is verified.
* Alternate Mode Verification - The third checkout function is verifying the
availability of alternate modes of operation. This function is essentially
a confidence check of the compatibility of subsystemsfinteraction and
performance during and after a change in the operating mode. To some
extent this function overlaps with redundant equipment verification, but
is broader in scope in that it verifies other system-operating character-
istics. For example, some modes will involve manual override or
control of automatic functions or automatic power-down sequences.
4. 2.1. 3 Fault Isolation
Fault isolation to an LRU is a Space Station goal. As shown in Figure 4-2,
fault isolation testing is initiated when malfunction indications cannot be directly
related to a failed LRU. The integrated test functions associated with fault isola-
tion are localizing a malfunction to a subsystem or to an explicit interface between
two subsystems and identifying the subroutine test necessary for LRU isolation.
In structuring this relationship between integrated subsystem tests for fault local-
ization and subroutine tests for fault isolation, the DMS, in conjunction with the
test procedure documentation, must establish an effective man-machine interface
so that in the event of an unsolved malfunction the crew will be able to help evalu-
ate the condition and determine other test sequences necessary to isolate the
problem. To accomplish this requirement, the DMS must be capable of displaying
test parameters and instructions in engineering units and'language and be capable
of referencing these outputs to applicable documentation or programs that correl-
ate test results to corrective action required by the crew.
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Section 5
ONBOARD CHECKOUT TEST DEFINITIONS
5.1 SUBSYSTEM TEST DEFINITIONS
The on-orbit tests required to insure the availability of the Space Station
subsystems are defined herein. Also delineated are the measurement and
stimulus parameters required to perform these tests. Two discrete levels of
testing are defined, i. e., continuous status monitoring tests for fault detection of
critical and noncritical parameters, and subsystem fault isolation tests for
localization of faults to a specific Line Replaceable Unit. In addition to these two
levels, tests are defined for periodic checkout and calibration of certain units,
and parameters requiring analysis of trends are defined.
Due to the software module approach to DMS checkout, it was deemed
necessary to estimate the CPU time and memory required to implement these
modules along with an assessment of the services required from an Executive
Software System to control the checkout.
These test descriptions, measurement, and stimulus information provided
for each subsystem, and the software sizing information provided for the Data
Management System provide the data required to estimate the checkout impact
on the DMS software and hardware. Table 5-1 is a summary of the measurement
and stimulus requirements for the Space Station.
Prior to defining specific tests, it is necessary to define the operating
environment. It is a requirement that testing be performed on-line and that fault
isolation to the LRU should be achieved to support a remove-and-replace main-
tenance philosophy. Operating on-line means that the testing performed must be
interleaved with other application programs. Within these constraints, it is
necessary to define:
(a) The provisions included to detect errors in data transfer on a
continuous basis
(b) The specific actions to be taken when errors occur within individual
DMS equipment
(c) The provisions included for verifying equipment operation on a periodic
basis
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(d) The provisions included for reverifying equipment subsequent to a
repair
(e) The OCS/crew interface with regard to equipment status information
and maintenance
The constraint of operating on-line indicates that overall operation must
occur somewhat as indicated in Figure 5-1. Concurrently with the execution of
Operations and Experiment programs, the OCS programs will be implemented on
a time available basis. During each of the time slots, certain portions of the OCS
responsibility must be performed. Test sequencing and control will be performed
by an OCS executive while overall time scheduling will be performed by the DMS
executive. The execution of the tests will be asynchronous, and the time allocated
will depend on the time demands of other programs.
Parity checking of all data transfer will occur during operation of all applica-
tion programs. This is not sufficient to verify complete operation of the DMS -
additional tests are required on functional areas on a scheduled basis during the
time slots allocated to OCS. These additional tests must be short enough to be
incorporated in the time slots, yet thorough enough to verify operation of the
equipment under test. Parity errors, depending on the source, will prompt the
running of some of the DMS tests to verify the error (see Figure 5-1). Other sub-
systems are polled as shown. These tests have been termed "Continuous Orbital
Monitoring" tests (COM). The operation described above will be an iterative
process - repeating after one complete subsystems test cycle. The tests performed
during the COM tests, however, may not be sufficient to isolate an error or failure.
It is anticipated that more extensive testing will be required on the DMS to isolate
the failure to a reconfigurable element (e. g., the testing of all interfaces after
LRU replacement). The second level of testing has been termed "Subsystem Fault
Isolation" (SFI) tests.
APPLICATION
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Figure 5-1. OCS Test Program Execution
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Within the DMS, errors can be generated from two sources; i. e. from parity
errors in any of the data transfer paths or from the COM diagnostics performed
on a periodic basis. Central processing unit, main memory, or I/O parity errors
will cause the appropriate COM tests to be performed to verify the error. If the
error is verified, the SFI tests may be performed to isolate the fault and recon-
figure the DMS to restore operation. Errors generated by the COM tests may
automatically cause the appropriate SFI tests to be executed or may notify the crew
to manually initiate the SFI test.
Bulk memory errors or data acquisition errors may trigger the SFI tests
directly. The figure also indicates that crew keyboard entry can initiate the SFI
tests. These principally are those tests which may be performed asynchronously,
tests performed upon demand, or those tests which may require crew participation.
Other events can be generated by out-of-tolerance conditions emanating from
measurements made on subsystem test points. Some additional processing
associated with failure analysis may be required for these cases. Figure 5-2
shows a top level flow of a typical failure event analysis. If an out-of-tolerance
condition occurs, it should be determined whether or not the event is associated
with a critical signal. Subsequent to this, it is important to know the failure
history of the function (i. e., whether it is the first or second failure). Other items
include determining the source of the event indication. If it is from BITE equipment
within a given subsystem, there is no alternative but to believe the indication and
execute the predetermined action. If the indication emanates from an RDAU, it is
possible to verify the event through an alternate path. Each of these decisions
can have two results, and all paths must be analyzed. An OCS test control hierarchy
that incorporates the separate responsibilities discussed above is shown in Figure
5-3. The SFI group includes the failure event analysis, fault isolation, equipment
reconfiguration sequence, and display/record messages.
5.1.1 CONTINUOUS ORBITAL MONITORING TESTS (COM)
The COM tests associated with the DMS are divided into three groups; i. e.,
one group contains software diagnostics only; another group includes the acquisition
and limit checking of test point data (through RDAUs), and the third group includes
the parity checking hardware. Figure 5-4 shows a representative top level flow
for the COM tests. These tests will not be performed without interruption as
shown, but rather will be performed on a time available basis under executive
control.
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5. 1. 1. 1 Computer Group
The purpose of the computer COM tests is to exercise periodically as much
of the central processing units, main store units, and data bus control units as
possible within time constraints and without causing interference to other applica-
tion programs. The COM tests shall verify capability of the following elements
of the computer group:
* CPU instruction operation (i. e., add, subtract, multiply, divide, etc. )
* CPU data flow
* Register, adder, shifter, and mover functions
* Main storage addressing
* Control communication between CPU and data bus controller
* Data flow between data bus controller and main memory
* Power supplies
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The CPU tests must be designed to test all arithmetic and logic functions of
the computer. The basic technique to be employed will be one of performance of
an operation and comparison of the actual results with the expected results. These
tests must be repeated on a scheduled basis in all six CPUs.
A limited MSU test will be accomplished by main storage addressing. The
test shall verify the addressability of individual MSUs by cycling through all MSU
addresses on a time available basis. This test need not be repeated for each CPU
test.
The COM tests also shall provide a functional check of the data bus controller
by a wraparound technique, using BITE hardware. This hardware will effectively
connect the bus controller output, address, and control lines to corresponding
input lines. The basic technique again is to compare actual results to expected
results.
In addition to these tests, power supply voltages and discrete indicators will
be polled through RDAUs for comparison or limit checking. As a general rule,
two consecutive errors or an out-of-tolerance measurement is caused for a sub-
system reconfiguration.
5.1.1.2 Bulk Memory Group
The principal COM tests on bulk memory will be supply voltage measure-
ments. All data which is transferred to or from bulk memory is parity checked,
and will be the principal source of error detection. Consecutive errors will initiate
Subsystem Fault Isolation Tests.
5.1. 1. 3 Data Acquisition Group
This group consists of the terminals, RDAUs, and stimulus generation units.
The wraparound technique will be utilized on a periodic basis to verify the opera-
bility of each terminal, RDAU, and SGU.
5.1.1.4 Command, Control, and Display Group
5.. 1. 4. 1 Command, Control Display Consoles (CCDC)
The CCDC COM tests will consist primarily of supply voltage measurements.
The displays and controls are subjected to testing through normal daily equipment
usage. Such items as loss of character generation, display quality, brightness,
etc., are self-annunciating, and special tests need not be mechanized. Crew
participation is required in most tests of CCDC (see CCDC SFI tests).
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5.. 1.14.2 Local Monitor and Display Unit (LMDU)
The COM test for LMDUs should be implemented in a similar manner as the
RDAUs; i.e., on a periodic basis, the LMDU should be utilized in a wraparound
type test for response generation. The response should be compared to an expected
pattern.
The display is subjected to a form of continuous orbital monitoring through
crew use and observations. There will be no special COM display tests utilized on
a continuous basis.
5.1.1. 5 Image Processing Group
The COM tests for the image processing equipment will consist primarily of
supply voltage and other analog measurements. Additional integral diagnostics
should be included with special purpose processors such that the diagnostics can
be commanded from the DMS computers. An interface with an RDAU should be
provided to implement communications with the DMS computers.
5.1.2 SUBSYSTEM FAULT ISOLATION TESTS (SFI)
The COM tests performed on a cyclic basis and supplemented with parity
checking comprise the fundamental DMS error or failure detection capability. If
a failure is detected, it must be isolated to a replaceable unit. The testing capa-
bility for isolating to the replaceable unit is called "Subsystem Fault Isolation (SFI).
Since it is incumbent upon the DMS/OCS to be able to isolate failures to the
line replaceable unit (LRU), a definition of these elements has been formulated.
These are partially a result of the degree in which a software/hardware system
can effectively isolate malfunctioning elements in addition to the physical considera-
tions of packaging and accessibility within a given equipment complex.
Several techniques are presently used to provide varying degrees of "self
checking" and fault isolation capability within computers. These techniques were
investigated with respect to their applicability for the Space Station OCS. In addi-
tion to the COM tests, four fundamental techniques will be used in the proposed
SFI scheme. The four include:
* Parity checking on all internal data
- Checks hardware for correct data handling capability.
* Known problem computation
- Checks hardware for correct data handling and computing
capability. Test more conclusive than parity checking.
- Extract problem routine from memory, work problem, verify
answer with correct answer stored in memory.
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* Hardware pattern generator
- Checks hardware for correct data handling capability.
- Generates known data word pattern for checking write/read
accuracy of memories.
* Crew interactive/manual tests
5. 1.2. 1 Computer SFI Tests
For the purpose of deriving a fault isolation scheme, the DMS/OCS computer
subset has been modeled as shown in Figure 5-5. This model is comprised of the
following elements:
* Data bus controller (DBC)
* Data bus switch matrix (DBSM)
* Data bus input/output (DBI/O)
* Shared memory matrix (SMM)
DATA BUS
CPU
Figure 5-5. Computer Subsystem Diagnostic/Fault Isolation Model
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- Shared memory
* Shared memory input/output (SMI/O)
* Logic and control (L & C)
* CPU dedicated memory
* Power supply and distribution
These elements have been described in Section 3. 4, Line Replaceable Unit
Definition.
Figure 5-6 depicts the proposed computer subsystem fault isolation logic
developed for the DMS/OCS. The primary diagnostic conditions utilized in this
scheme are:
* Detection of parity errors
* Incorrect (or no) response to a command or pattern check
The "soft power down" activity is noted in Figure 5-6 only to the extent of
depicting the isolatable unit involved. By its very nature, it is self-diagnostic and
isolating.
The flow diagram indicates a shared memory as an isolatable unit. By
employing certain manual procedures supplemented with additional automatic (via
OCS) tests, the shared memory units can be further broken down to a lower level
of isolation i. e., the LRU level. Figure 5-7 gives a unified fault isolation model
for the shared memory unit.
Manual diagnostic/fault isolation procedures for determination of the shared
memory LRUs would be dependent upon the type of OCS notification, i.e.,
Type I - Shared memory will not respond to inquiry or command
Type II - Shared memory generating parity errors or incorrect write/
read of known pattern
Figure 5-8 depicts the manual diagnostic and fault isolation logic for the
shared memories. It is postulated that the mechanical sections will have some
type of self-test capability to determine operational status. This self-test capa-
bility would be manually actuated in such a manner as to demonstrate the action of
various mechanical, and electro mechanical components (motors, solenoids, gears,
etc. ). A human operator, following a prescribed diagnostic routine, could then
reasonably assess the operational status of the mechanical section.
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Figure 5-7. Shared Memory Unit Manual Diagnostic/Fault Isolation Model
5. 1. 2. 2 Bulk Data Storage
Figure 5-9 is a diagnostic/fault isolation model for the bulk data storage
facility. This model is comprised of the following elements, each of which has
been described in Section 3. 4, Line Replaceable Unit Definition.
* Digital Buffer and Control Unit
* Record/Reproduce Electronics
* Switch Matrices
* Tape Transport Controller
* Tape Transport
* Power Supply and Distribution Units
Figure 5-10 depicts the proposed bulk data storage fault isolation logic. The
primary diagnostic conditions utilized in this scheme are the same as those noted
for the computer subsystem fault isolation scheme.
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Figure 5-10. Bulk Data Storage Fault Isolation Flow Diagram
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5.1. 2. 3 Data Acquisition Subsystem
A typical Data Acquisition Subsystem element is shown in Figure 5-11. This
element is a representative hardware configuration for a majority of the identified
data acquisition requirements on the Space Station. It is comprised of the following
elements, each of which has been described in Section 3. 4, Line Replaceable Unit
Definition:
* Data Bus Terminal (DBT)
* Remote Data Acquisition Unit (RDAU)
* Stimuli Generation Unit (SGU)
SUBSYSTEM/EXPERIMENT
Figure 5-11. Typical Data Acquisition Element
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It is incumbent upon the DMS/OCS to be able to identify malfunctioning
elements to the lowest replaceable unit (LRU) in the system loop. Each of these
units has the ability under DMS/OCS computer control to perform an operational
self-check of its circuitry or, in the case of the SGU, to provide a special test
output which can be monitored by a known "good" RDAU and thereby provide an
indication as to the functional status of the SGU. Using these built-in capabilities,
the DMS/OCS can, with proper programming, initiate checkout routines in such a
manner as to identify LRUs and other elements which indicate fault operation.
The fault isolation logic for the data acquisition elements is given in Figure 5-12.
Figure 5-12. Data Acquisition Element Fault Isolation System Flow Diagram
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Since the OCS ground rules do not preclude manual fault isolation activities,
their use was integrated in the proposed scheme only to the extent necessary to
supplement the automatic fault isolation and only in those cases where it would
be extremely expensive to implement or would be impossible from a practical
standpoint. The flow chart depicts two items which indicate the need for manual
troubleshooting.
1. Addressed data terminal does not respond to valid commands. This
indicates a possibility of a bad data terminal/data bus connection or a
catastrophic data terminal failure. The possibility of a bad data bus
can be investigated by checking continuity of data transmission on that
particular branch.
2. Bad data is being received but the DBT and RDAU self-checks are
satisfactory, and the stimulation responses are correct. This is a
situation which would tend to indicate a sensor assembly/function under
test which responded correctly to a calibrated input (simulation signal),
but not correctly to a measured parameter input. This would, however,
be a legitimate indication if the stimulation signal was inserted at points
in the system different from the measured parameter input. In this case,
it would indicate a fault in the portion of the system not included in the
stimulation loop.
This fault isolation scheme would, with the exceptions noted above, auto-
matically indicate which data acquisition LRU would need to be replaced. The
actual replacement would then be a manual operation. The "Replace" signals
could be used to switch in redundant units for noncritical parameters in addition to
providing the display. For critical functions, this scheme would provide a status
display only since these functions will be implemented operationally redundant.
5.1.2.4 Command/Control and Display Console SF1 Tests
It is postulated that the individual control and display assemblies (status
lights, keyboards, pushbuttons, etc.) of the Command/Control and Display Console
will be respectively "unitized" and contain their own particular encode/decode
electronics. For example: the computer keyboard assembly is comprised of the
mechanical key assembly and all required control and encode electronics. This
entire keyboard assembly could be removed, as a unit, from the CCDC. Light
panels, alphanumeric displays, etc., would be handled in a similar manner. The
CRT display assembly would contain the CRT, deflection circuitry, and all re-
quired video control circuitry.
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Figure 5-13 shows a top level flow for the CCDC SFI tests. The tests include
both automatic and manual tests. The automatic tests include those associated with
the data bus terminal, command buffer and control unit, and stimulus generation
unit. Tests associated with lamps, CRT displays, or viewers are manual tests.
5.1. 2.5 Image Processing SFI Tests
As in the CCDC, image processing SFI tests will be largely manual. The
automatic tests are concerned with the digital equipment interfacing the computers.
Figure 5-14 shows a preliminary top level SFI flow diagram for the image pro-
cessing equipment.
5.1.3 DMS TEST TIMING
Tests typical of those required for the DMS can be sized for memory and
execution time, but the frequency with which the tests must be performed was not
specified. in addition, certain units within the DMS probably will be checked more
frequently than others. Because the aggregate contribution to computing load by
the DMS/OCS depends upon these items, it is necessary to assure the frequency of
performing tests and the sequence or order in which the units are checked.
The two principal factors upon which the test iteration rate could be based
are the failure rates and mission criticality. Of the two factors, criticality will
demand the highest iteration rate. The approach taken has been to examine the
mission and to specify a maximum time during which an undetected failure can be
tolerated. The cumulative time required for detecting the failure, for isolating
the failure, and for recovery must be equal to or less than the total time during
which the failure can be tolerated.
A moderate worst case which can be utilized as a basis for affixing the
iteration rate is a docking operation. During this operation certain commands
and responses are exchanged between the Space Station and the docking vehicle.
Some of the considerations involved in this operation are discussed in McDonnell
Douglas Space Station Electronics Subsystem Study (DRL 8, Volume 5, Book 5,
pages 169-177). The primary docking mode is automatic, but with crew observa-
tion having override capability. Failures in the DMS will cause erratic or total
loss of data exchange capability with the docking vehicle for a period of time.
During docking, range and closing rate are important parameters involved in
command maneuvers. Erratic or loss of computational capabilities may be mani-
fested through range errors or closing rate errors. Errors which permit too
rapid a closing rate can affect vehicle safety, while errors permitting too slow an
approach expend docking vehicle fuel unnecessarily.
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Figure 5-13. Command/Control and Display Console Fault Isolation Flow Diagram
(cont)
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For analysis purposes, it was assumed that the maximum allowable error
build-up in closing rate is 10 percent (i. e., due to DMS failure to deliver or re-
move some command). At one foot per second in the near vicinity of the Space
Station, the maximum allowable error would be 0. 1 foot per second. If a 100-
pound thruster were left "ON" due to a failure, the time required to produce a
0. 1 foot/sec velocity increase towards the Space Station would be (assuming a
40, 000 pound vehicle):
0.1
V 100
t = = = 40 seconds
aac. 40,000
If it is assumed further that any errors imparted to the system must be
removed upon recovery, the tests must be performed in one half the time above
or 20 seconds. Therefore, an iteration rate of once per twenty seconds was
utilized for sizing the software for checkout of that DMS equipment involved in the
critical operation.
The DMS equipment appears to fall into four categories with regard to the
frequency of testing. The first group is a critical group consisting of the CPUs,
main memory units, data bus controllers, critical terminals, and critical RDAUs.
This group is tested once per 20 seconds in accordance with the postulated worst
case situation. The second group is less critical, and consists primarily of the
remaining terminals and RDAUs. The second group should be checked at least
once per hour, and will also contain all discrete and analog measurements to be
made on DMS equipment (e. g., power supplies).
The third group consists primarily of bulk and mass memories and displays.
This group should be checked at least once per 24 hours. The fourth group will
be an "on-demand" group associated with image processing, repair verification,
calibration, etc. Table 5-2 summarizes the iteration periods.
5.1.4 DMS MEASUREMENTS/STIMULI
In addition to the software programs and BITE provisions, a series of
measurements must be made on certain DMS equipment. The measurements will
be concerned principally with power supply measurements and temperature
measurements.
Each supply contains certain protective circuitry associated with over-
voltage, under-voltage, and over-current protection. Each supply should provide
a discrete logic output indicating that a limit has been exceeded. The logic output
would be monitored via an RDAU.
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Table 5-2. Iteration Periods
1/20 sec. 1/hour 1/24 Hours On-Demand
COM tests SFI Tests
1. CPUs 1. All DMS Mea- 1. Bulk and 1. Image Pro-
surements mass cessing
memories
2. MSUs 2. Noncritical 2. Standard Dis- 2. Calibration
Terminals and play Patterns
RDAUs * CCDC
* LMDU
3. DBCs 3. SGUs 3. SFI Tests
4. Critical 4. Repair Veri-
DBTs fication
5. Critical
RDAUs
6. Measurements
Associated with
above LRUs
Temperature measurements will be checked on equipment likely to require
monitoring. The measurements will be made on the racks through which the
coolant will flow. Actual measurement will be performed and limit checked within
the RDAUs.
Appendix I-9 of Final Report Task 1 lists the measurements and stimuli re-
quired to complete checkout of the DMS.
5.1.5 DMS TEST SOFTWARE SIZING STUDY
The approach taken in the study was to implement the Command SFI tests
previously described to estimate the DMS resources required to perform the tests.
Flow charts were generated to describe the logic for each test. Accompanying
each test flow is an estimate of the memory required, the CPU time required to
execute, and the I/O time required if applicable.
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Because software sizing is very much involved with the basic organization of
the processing equipment, it was necessary to expand considerably the baseline
DMS to assume additional architectural features. Many of the assumed features
were with regard to:
* Processor interrupt features and instruction capabilities
* How processor-to-processor communications are implemented to
convey CPU failure data to other CPUs
* How main memory is organized with regard to addressing, memory
contents, table formats, preferential storage areas, etc.
· How the I/O channels are assumed to operate
* The channel command word format
* How information tables are stored with regard to configuration control
* How out-of-tolerance conditions propagate through the data acquisition
path
Certain of the features above are key to OCS software sizing of DMS tests
while other features may be more important to executive control of OCS and
general software design. Most of the features assumed have been utilized in one or
more applications for similar purposes (e. g., in the IBM System/4 Pi and IBM
System/360 lines).
5.1. 5.1 Architectural Assumptions
5.1. 5. 1. 1 Microprogram - The processor can be microprogrammed so that
the basic instruction set can be augmented without requiring an engineering change
to the processor. The need for such augmentation arises from the requirement
to automatically test, isolate, and reconfigure the DMS hardware under software
control. An example of this type of instruction is the one used to set the address
translation register of a shared memory LRU.
It is also assumed that the processor contains special reconfiguration
instructions (e. g., "set configuration control registers"). Configuration control
registers within each configurable element will be the principal means of maintain-
ing configuration control.
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5. 1. 5. 1. 2 Interrupts - An Interrupt System exists to provide a means by which
a computer can make rapid response to extra-program circumstances that occur
at arbitrary times and perform a maximum amount of useful work while waiting
for such circumstances. Parity errors, failures, or out-of-tolerance conditions
will result in an "interrupt. " The types of interrupts assumed include:
* "Machine Check" interrupt is provided in the event of machine
malfunctions (e. g., failures in processors, memories, or data
bus controllers).
* '"I/" interrupts are provided as a means whereby a CPU will
respond to a request from an external device. Out-of-tolerance
conditions as indicated via RDAU limit checking will cause an
I/O interrupt.
* "Program" interrupts to denote improper specification or use
of instructions and/or data.
* "Supervisor Call" interrupt to implement a high speed request
for executive services (e. g., task switching, storage allocation,
data logging, configuration control register management, etc. ).
* "External" interrupts for miscellaneous purposes (e. g., to enable
a response to timers, crew console keys, and processor-to-
processor communications).
5. 1. 5. 1. 3 Parity - Parity checking will be utilized to provide a continuous
checkout of all data transfer to and from the processors. Parity errors in
general will result in a machine check interrupt.
5. 1. 5. 1. 4 Processor-to-Processor Communications - Processor-to-processor
communications exist to permit the asynchronous transfer of data pertinent to
reconfiguration to other processors. Actual communication will be implemented
through the data bus controllers rather than through a direct interface (avoids the
case where each processor must "pass along" information regarding other pro-
cessor conditions).
5. 1. 5. 1. 5 Configuration Control Capability - A "configuration control register"
will be maintained in each DMS configurable element to establish the prevailing
subsystem structure by specifying to each element its state, the processors from
which it accepts configuration changes, and the elements to which it listens in
the exchange of data and certain control signals. The operational processors will
have the capability of examining and setting all configuration control registers for
system configuration data.
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5. 1. 5. 1. 6 Real-Time Clock - A "real-time" clock is required to keep a copy of
the reference clock (reference clock is external to the processor). It is included
in the processor to allow high speed reference to real time.
5. 1. 5. 1. 7 Interval Timer - A high resolution interval timer is included for
storage of the interval remaining until a time dependent event must be initiated.
When the interval elapses, an interrupt occurs such that high frequency polling
of a clock is not necessary.
5. 1. 5. 1. 8 Storage Address Translation Capability - Storage address transla-
tion capability exists to facilitate the interchange and reconfiguration of main
memory elements.
5. 1. 5. 1. 9 Use of Dedicated Memory - The dedicated memory associated with
each processor will be used as a buffer which is not addressable by a program,
but rather is employed by the processor to contain those portions of main storage
currently being used. When the program starts operating on data in a different
portion of main storage, the data in that portion is loaded by the processor into
the buffer and the data from some other portion removed. This activity takes
place without program assistance and is completely transparent to any program
instruction.
The main storage organization as seen by each processor is as follows:
* Define Pi, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . as the preferential storage LRU associated
with each processor. See Figure 5-15.
* Each processor "sees" the first LRU of addressable memory as the
LRU containing its own preferential storage area (PSA).
* Beginning with the highest address expressable in 24 bits (4000 K words)
and proceeding downward, each processor has the hardware capability
to assess the preferential storage areas of other processors, for fault
isolation and reconfiguration purposes. Authorization is under software
control.
This arrangement allows for expanding the number of processors and the
amount of main storage without disturbing the addressing scheme.
A special instruction is available to set the PSA base address (e. g., as in
the IBM/FAA 9020 system) thus allowing the PSA to be in shared, instead of
dedicated, memory.
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Figure 5-15. Main Storage Organization Seen By Processor
5.1. 5. 1. 10 Processor-to-Memory Communications - It is fundamentally
necessary for OCS purposes for any processor to access any other processor
PSA because it is in this area that data is stored as a result of a machine check.
This data will be used by an OCS processor to perform LRU isolation on other
processors.
5. 1. 5. 1. 11 Processor Allocation - The processor allocation services of the
master executive will effect a partitioning between the Experiment and Operational
multiprocessors.
5. 1. 5. 1. 12 PSA Access - The Operational processors will be allowed to access
a "diagnostic scan out" area within each PSA of other processors for failure
detection/isolation purposes.
5.1. 5.1.13 Memory Unit Configuration Control - All memory units contain a
configuration control register and an address translation register to facilitate
real-time changes in configuration.
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5.1. 5.1. 14 Memory Addressing - Units are addressed relative to "zero" to
permit logical substitution among memory units. An actual address is formed by
a processor, utilizing the sum of the contents of the address translation register
and the relative address within the memory. This process is transparent to
software.
5. 1. 5. 1. 15 Duplicate Executive Capability - Duplicate copies of the master
executive will be maintained in main memory to avoid loss of configuration control.
5. 1. 5. 1. 16 Data Bus Controller (DBC) I/O Operations - It is assumed that the
data bus controller can execute I/O operations independent of processor operations
by obtaining data bus program from main memory (similar to the channel operation
in the IBM System/360). The assumption allows the processor to be devoted to
main storage programs leaving the comparatively slow I/O programs to the bus
controller.
5. 1. 5. 1. 17 DBC Configuration Control - The data bus controller contains a
configuration control register to facilitate real-time changes in configuration.
5. 1. 5.1.18 Processor-to-Processor Data Flow - The DBC provides a processor-
to-processor data flow path for improved configuration flexibility.
5.1. 5.1.19 Data Bus Command Word Format - A sample format for the data
bus controller command word is shown below.
COMMAND' DATA ADDRESS (IN FLAGS 000 BYTE COUNT
0 7 8 31SHARED MEMORY36 37 39 40 48 63
0 7 8 31 32 36 37 39 40 48 63
5. 1. 5.1. 20 Data Acquisition I/O Operation - An I/O operation will be initiated
by a processor instruction (e. g., Start I/O) containing an operand which addresses
down to the data bus terminal level in the data path. The format is shown as
follows:
16 BITS
r I
DBC SPARE TERMINAL SPARE
2 BITS 4 BITS 7 BITS 3 BITS
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The data bus controller will be commanded by the processor I/O instruction
to fetch a data bus command program from main storage. The program will
supply the additional addressing and commands to be utilized by the lowest level in
the data path (e. g., RDAU or SGU input/output).
5.1. 5.1.21 Data Acquisition Command Structure - Typical RDAU commands
will include:
* SEEK (address RDAU/line)
* WRITE RDAU MEMORY (set RDAU limits and mask)
* READ RDAU (sequential read of one or more RDAU channels.
Channels addresses "wraparound" from highest to lowest)
* READ RDAU MEMORY (read RDAU limits and mask)
16 BITS
SEEK SPARE RDAU LINE
The SGU will be handled as in the case of an RDAU; i. e., a "start I/O"
instruction and channel program. The format is as follows:
16 BITS
r
I STIMULATE I SPARE ISGU NUMBERI WAVEFORMI
Discrete command outputs to any subsystem will be handled through the
data bus terminal. The format is as shown:
16 BITS
A
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DATA BUS 
EDDb- 1-STIMULATE SPARE TERMINAL ADS
NUMBER LINENUMBER
5. 1. 5. 1. 22 Controls and Displays - The controls and displays will be treated
similarly to the RDAU; i. e., they will respond to a specific set of instructions
contained in a data bus command program. The Experiment and Command/Control
consoles will be handled the same.
5.1. 5.1.23 Polling Technique - The fundamental method of announcing out-of-
tolerance conditions (which must generate an unexpected interrupt) is via a hard-
ware polling. Each RDAU, independently of command, limit checks all inputs.
Out-of-tolerance conditions will be stored in a register within the RDAU. Each
terminal must poll theRDAU continuously and store any out-of-tolerance con-
ditions. The data bus controller will poll the terminals for interrupt conditions.
All subsystems which interface with the terminals will announce special status
conditions in the same manner, i. e., conditions are announced in the same bit
positions. Unused RDAU channels will be masked to avoid generating interrupts.
The mask of the secondary RDAU will prevent two separate interrupts from
occurring because a single test point signal is out of limits.
5. 1. 5. 1. 24 Functional Levels of Operation - Throughout test descriptions
where "reconfiguration" or "configurable element" is used, the subdivisions are
as defined in the following hierarchy.
* SUBSYSTEM
· CONFIGURATION
· CONFIGURABLE ELEMENT
· LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT (LRU)
The "Subsystem" level includes the complete DMS equipment. A "Configura-
tion" represents a particular combination of DMS equipment utilized at a given
time (e. g., the particular bus controller, bus terminal, and RDAU in use at a
given time). A "Configurable Element" is the level at which DMS reconfiguration
is performed. A "Configurable Element" can be comprised of one or more LRUs
(e. g., the processor contains multiple LRUs). The LRU is the smallest denom-
ination of equipment for which fault isolation is attempted and is the level at which
"on-line" remove-and-replace maintenance is performed.
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Participation of configurable elements in various DMS operations is shown
below:
(a) DATA PATH
TEST
MEMORY ------ DBC - DBT RD A U I----POINT
(b) STORED-PROGRAM EXECUTION
PROCESSOR3 MEMORY
(c) I/O OPERATIONS
,PROCESSOR I-'~
(d) SHOULDER TAP
PROCESSOR
PROCESSOR
(e) UNEXPECTED INTERRUPT PRESENTATION
S
W
P2 T
C
P3 H
i=-4 ~~DBC
M
P5 A
T
P6 ~ s~-- ~ s~ R
X
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(f) TEST POINT POLLING
D : TEST
A . POINTSU J1
(g) SET CONFIGURATION CONTROL REGISTERS
Pa - OPERATIONS PROCESSOR
P - EITHER AN EXPERIMENT OR
b
AN OPERATIONS PROCESSOR
(h) PRIMARY/SECONDARY DATA PATH
44
TEST
POINT
NOTE:
A FAILURE AT ANY POINT IN THE DATA PATH
FROM THE DBC TO THE RDAU CAN CAUSE A
RECONFIGURATION TO THE SECONDARY DATA PATH
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5.1 . 5. 2 COM Test Software Sizing
The general organization and descriptions of Continuous Orbital Monitoring
tests are shown pictorially in Figure 5-16. Three main groupings occur based on
the rate at which each group is performed. Within each group, there is included
the item being tested and the name of a test implemented on the item under test.
There is another category not shown in Figure 5-16, i. e., an "ON DEMAND"
group initiated by the crew. Accompanying each test is an estimate of CPU time,
memory required, and the I/O time if applicable. The CPU times are based on
a 1 microsecond memory cycle time and instruction timing formulas of the System/
4 Pi Model EP computer. Where System/4 Pi timing formulas were used, the
times were scaled to take into account the 1 microsecond memory (4 Pi EP mem-
ory cycle time is normally 2. 5 miscroseconds). Where System/4 Pi EP instruct-
ions were not available for the study, appropriate System/360 timing formulas
were used.
IMAGE MEMORY TESTS/
PROCESSING DISPLAY PATTERNS
PATTERN TESTS/iv DISPLAYSe * - e e MANUAL TESTS
BULK COMMAND/READ/
MEM. ··· WRITE TESTS
k/r MEASURE;-·,··· POLLING
MENTS
WRAP/MEMORY
TEST
v) --/r D_ ' _DBTs *ee*seeesee· WRAP TEST
MEMORY
0 MAINseeee·eeseess ADDRESSING
\·eeeee*****@ MICROPROGRAMMED
MEASURE- *-* * *** POLLING
i/r MENTS
WRAP/MEMORY
TEST
DBT .ee.e.eeee*** e WRAPTEST
DBCe · *eeeeee eee · WRAPTEST
MAIN MEMORY
MEM. ·eeee ee ADDRESSING
CPUCPAU * @ PROCESSOR
~POLLA ~STATUSPOLL
NOTE CPU ··*··········· MICROPROGRAMMED
* "r" IS THE RESOLUTION OF
THE INTERVAL TIMERS.
· "i", "j", "k" ARE
POSITIVE INTEGERS; i j k.
· TEST EXECUTION RATES SPECIFIED
AS i/r, j/r, k/r.
Figure 5-16. COM Test Organization
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5.1. 5.2. 1 CPU COM Test - It is assumed that the CPU test is microprogrammed
and initiated with a "DIAGNOSE" instruction. For timing purposes, it is assumed
that the test requires 10 milliseconds to execute. The results of the test are read
out to a "diagnostic scan out" area of the processor preferential storage in shared
main memory. The test results are accessible by other processors for fault
detection/isolation purposes. In the assumed implementation there are two
methods of indicating that a CPU is in trouble:
* The processor-to-processor link via the bus controller. This would be
a "write direct" to the OCS processor which would generate a machine
check interrupt.
* If the above path fails, the OCS processor will poll PSAs to look at the
diagnostic scan out area for all processors.
The flow and sizing estimate for the diagnostic scan out area poll are shown
in Figure 5-17.
5.1. 5.2.2 COM Memory Addressing - The memory addressing test will-con-
sist of addressing all main memory locations. A location which cannot be read
will cause a parity error. The flow and sizing estimate are shown in Figure 5-18.
5.1. 5. 2.3 Data Bus Controller COM "Wrap" Test - This test consists of
issuing special I/O commands to configure the DBC to a test mode. A hardware
feature in the DBC will permit a pattern from main memory to be transferred to
the DBC which will "wrap" the pattern to the lines to be relocated in memory.
The patterns returned to memory are compared to those sent for failure informa-
tion. The patterns will be stored on a byte basis and there will be 256 patterns or
bytes. The "wrap" test will be performed on all four data bus controllers. The
command word format will be as shown below.
SEND g
RECEIVE _
The test flow and sizing estimate are shown in Figure 5-19.
5.1. 5.2. 4 Data Bus Terminal COM "Wrap" Test - This test will be identical
to the data bus controller "wrap" test where I/O commands will configure the
DBT to a test mode. Patterns will be transferred from memory to the terminal
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DBC MAIN STORAGE ADDRESS
WRAP FOR PATTERN TO CON- CHAIN FLAG
WRITE TROLLER
DBC MAIN STORAGE ADDRESS
WRAP FOR RETURN PATTERN
READ
CPU POLL
CPU
TABLE
CPU 1
CPU 2
CPU 3
CPU 4
CPU 5
CPU 6
CPU PSA I PORT
ID ADDR NO.
PHYSICAL
LOCATION
OF CPU
TABLE STORAGE
20 BYTES PER CPU
LOOP TIME = 60 USEC FOR 6 CPUs (10 USEC/CPU)
TOTAL TIME = 106 USEC + 12
MEMORY = 30+ 6 WORDS
Figure 5-17. CPU Diagnostic Scan Out Area Poll
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EXIT
MEMORY ADDRESS
TEST ENTRY
ENTRY/EXIT TIME = 38 USEC.
ENTRY/EXIT STORAGE = 11 WORDS
TIME = 24+3 MSEC PER 16 KLRU
MEMORY = 23 + 4 WORDS
EXIT
Figure 5-18. Memory Addressing Test Flow
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ENTRY
ENTRY/EXIT TIME = 38 USEC.
CPU TIME = 614+60 USEC.
MEMORY = 94 + 10 WORDS
Figure 5-19. DBC COM Wrap Test Flow
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and returned to memory for comparison. The patterns are stored on a byte basis,
and there will be 256 patterns or bytes. The command word format is as shown
below:
SEND
RECEIVE - N
There is an additional "time" or delay involved in this test; i. e., there is
an I/O time required for the serial transfer of the patterns to the terminal and
for the serial return. I/O time is based on a data bus bit rate of one megabit
per second.
The flow is essentially the same as for the data bus controller "wrap" test
(Figure 5-19). The sizing estimate is as follows:
ENTRY/EXIT TIME = 38 usec
CPU Time/Terminal = 397 +40 usec
Memory = 98 +10 words
I/O Time/Terminal = 4096 usec
NOTES: 1. Data bus time is the transfer of 256 bytes at 16 usec per byte.
Total I/O time = 200, 000 usec for 50 terminals.
2. The CPU time is 46 + 351 n, where "n" is the number of
terminals. Total CPU time is 17,600 usec for 50 terminals.
5.1.5.2.5 RDAU COM Tests - There are two tests associated with the RDAUs;
i. e., one is similar to the DBC/DBT wrap tests, and the second is a memory/
multiplexer test. In the first test, a form of "wrap" test is performed but a
pattern is not transferred from main memory. Instead, a DC voltage developed
within the RDAU is connected to one channel of the multiplexer. The voltage is
converted to digital and transmitted to the CPU for comparison to an expected
value. The flow is essentially the same as for the DBC/DBT tests (Figure 5-19)
and, for this reason, is not repeated. The sizing estimate is as follows:
ENTRY/EXIT TIME = 38 usec
CPU TIME = 18,750 +1875 usec (for 133 RDAUs*)
MEMORY = 38 +4 words
I/O Time = 1400 + 1400 usec (105 usec/RDAU)
*Formula for CPU time = 46 + 138 n, where n = number of RDAUs.
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DBT MAIN STORAGE ADDRESS
WRAP FOR PATTERN TO TERMINAL
DBT MAIN STORAGE ADDRESS
WRAP' FOR RETURN PATTERN
The second RDAU test is the memory/multiplexer test. In this test the
contents of RDAU memory are read to verify that the contents are as expected,
and then a sequential "read" is made to verify all channels of the multiplexer.
The approximate RDAU memory assumed is:
LIMITS 64 Bytes
ANALOG MASK 4 Bytes
DISCRETE MASK 4 Bytes
EXPECTED DISCRETE PATTERN 4 Bytes
TOTAL 76 Bytes
The total entry/exit time, CPU time, and I/O time for the tests will be the
sum of the times required for the individual tests. The test flow for the memory/
multiplexer test and the sizing estimate are shown in Figure 5-20.
5. 1. 5. 2. 6 Image Processing COM Tests - An assumption is made that a crew
member must manually initiate or commit a device within image processing to
actual test performance.
The COM tests cannot interrupt any operation being executed within the
experiment group or within bulk memory. It is assumed that a recommended
schedule for testing will be relayed to the crew via a CRT display.
In the actual image processing test, the only OCS processor participation is
in the check of the permanent and working digital storage and displays (again it is
performed only upon authorization or request by a crew member because the test
may destroy memory contents). The actual memory tests will consist of trans-
mitting patterns from the OCS to the memories and rereading the memory for
pattern comparison. After completion of the memory test, a display pattern is
written on the CRTs. The display test pattern will contain all alphanumerics which
will be observed by the crew. Successful completion will be entered into a key-
board. The remainder of the image processing group is assumed manually
controlled through BITE equipment. These tests will not affect the software
sizing. The test flow for the memory test is shown in Figure 5-21.
For the display part of the image processing tests, additional display
assumptions were required. These include:
e- Operation similar to -B-M 2250 Display
* Vector capability
e At least 64 characters
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ENTRY/EXIT MEMORY - 11 WORDS
ENTRY/EXIT TIME = 38 USEC.
CPU-TIME = 1711 + 172 USEC.
MEMORY = 77+ 8 WORDS
I/O TIME = COMMAND TIME + RESPONSE TIME
COMM = 2 BYTES
RESP = 76 BYTES
I/O TIME = 1308±130 USEC.
ON
MESSAGE p~C; II EXIT
"REPLACE 
ig I -RDAU" I M
Figure 5-20. RDAU Memory/Multiplexer Test Flow
GOOD
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MEMORY -43 5Sn/4 WORDS
CPU TIME -40741 + 8 N SEC.
I/O TIME = 32+ 16 N USEC.
WHERE: N = BYTE CAPACITY
OF WORKING STORAGE
NO
EXIT
Figure 5-21. Image Processing COM Memory Test Flow
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A candidate display pattern which can be sized is shown in Figure 5-22. The
display utilizes all symbols, numerics, vectors, etc. The flow for the test pattern
is shown in Figure 5-23.
5.1. 5.2. 7 Bulk Memory COM Tests - The bulk memory tests will be auth-
orized by a crew member as in the image processing tests. In the case of tapes,
a crew member must mount a special test tape. The actual tests for peripheral
devices are fairly standard and consist of the execution of the various device
commands and of writing/reading bit patterns. A top level flow for the bulk
memory tests is included in Figure 5-24. Sizing estimates are based on the IBM
System/360 On Line Test System (OLTS).
5. 1. 5.2. 8 DMS COM Measurement Limit Checks - In addition to the software
programs and BITE provisions, a series of measurements must be made on cer-
tain DMS equipment. The measurements will be concerned principally with power
supply measurements and temperature measurements.
Since each RDAU independently polls and limit checks measurements, there
is no separate program flow as such. If an out-of-tolerance condition occurs, it
ultimately causes a program interrupt and the RDAU is checked through a "wrap"
and "memory/multiplexer" tests discussed earlier.
5. 1. 5. 2. 9 GN&C Preprocessor COM Test - Without explicit details of the
preprocessor characteristics, actual test descriptions cannot be evolved. For
purposes of sizing the DMS-OCS, it is assumed that the preprocessors have an
integral test capability through incorporation of BITE, and that they will respond
to test commands from the OCS via the data bus. The response from the
f/~ ~ 4 BYTES 
4 i4 / x x x x x x 64
BYTES NUMERICS BYTES
X X X X X X X
41/.-'
BYTES
Figure 5-22. Sample Display Test Pattern
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NO
* EXIT
EXIT
NO
YES
EXIT
Figure 5-23. Image Processing Display Test Flow
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preprocessors is assumed in the form of a GO/NO GO discrete signal. The power
supplies for each preprocessor will be monitored and limit checked by RDAUs.
The sizing estimate is as follows:
Memory = 100 +50 words
CPU Time = 40 +20 usec
I/O Time = 100 +30 usec/processor
5.1. 5.3 Subsystem Fault Isolation Test Software Sizing
In many cases, the performance of the COM tests, through the device
addressing, inherently yields fault isolation. Consequently, many of the SFI
tests will be common to the COM tests. The capability must exist for performing
any of the COM tests (which may be utilized as SFI tests) upon initiation by a crew
member. The SFI tests which are common to the COM tests include the CPU tests,
data bus controller, data bus terminal, RDAU, displays, bulk memory, and image
processing. Unique tests are required in the area of memory units and switch
matrices.
ENTRY (VIA CALL)
DETERMINE
DEVICE
TYPE
TEST FOR
DISKS
I--Ir I'I I
TEST FOR TEST FOR OTHER IOTHER ITAPES DRUMS I
I I
L-- I
MAIN STORE = 2K -1K WORDS
CPU TIME = 44*1 SEC.
I/O TIME = 32 -15 SEC.
MAIN STORE = 2K 1K WORDS
CPU TIME = 34-2 SEC.
I/O TIME = 54420 SEC.
MAIN STORE = 2K*4 1K WORDS
CPU TIME = 4 *1 SEC.
I/O TIME = 19+48 SEC.
Figure 5-24. Bulk Storage COM Tests
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5.1. 5.3.1 Shared Main Memory - The COM main memory test checked to
determine if each memory location could be addressed. The SFI test consists of
generating a pattern in one location in memory, writing the pattern into the
memory under test, and re-reading the pattern to compare it to the original
pattern. The SFI flow and sizing estimate for the memory test is shown in
Figure 5-25.
5. 1. 5. 3. 2 Switch Matrix - There are two switch matrix units in the baseline;
i.e., a data bus controller switch matrix and a memory switch matrix. There
will not be an explicit switch matrix test, but rather one of the COM tests may be
attempted in different configurations to logically isolate the problem.
Three cases have been considered for problems associated with the switch
matrices.
* Case "A" - A problem exists in communication between a processor
and a data bus controller as shown below:
PRIMDAT|RY | SECONDARY
DATA BUS DATA BUS
CONTROLLER CONTROLLER
MATRIX
* Case "B" - A problem exists in communication between the processor
and memory as shown below:
MAIN MAIN 
MEMORY MEMORY
LRU1 LRU2
MEMORY
PROCESSOR * SWITCH
MATRIX
* Case "C" - A communication problem exists between the data bus
controllers and main memory as shown below:
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ENTRY
COMPAREI MEMORY EXIT
? I LRU j
ON RETURN TO EXIT
OPERATIONAL E X
STATUS.
ENTRY/EXIT TIME = 38 USEC.
MEMORY = 43* 5 WORDS
CPU TIME = 884* 24 MSEC.
SHIFT
PATTERN
Figure 5-25. Shared Main Memory SFI Flow
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Flows for Cases "A," "B, " and "C" are shown in Figures 5-26, 5-27, and 5-28.
The aggregate of CPU time and memory required to implement the three
cases described is:
CPU time = 200 +160 usec
Memory = 150 +100 words
5. 1. 5. 4 DMS Reconfiguration Software Sizing
A set of subsystem elements in which communication and control paths are
established constitutes a prevailing "configuration. " When elements are added,
deleted, or substituted, a new configuration is created; the process of establishing
the new configuration is called "reconfiguration. " Whenever reconfiguration takes
place, the total resources of the subsystem have changed, and appropriate actions
are required such that OCS is aware of the conditions. Reconfiguration can be
invoked due to failures or due to a resource reallocation, but this report does not
consider the latter. Configuration control normally is under program control,
i. e., reconfiguration will occur automatically via OCS. Display messages will be
sent to the crew for notification of reconfiguration or for cases where manual
actions are necessary.
PROCESSOR TO DATA BUS
CONTROLLER PROBLEM
H
EXIT
EXIT
Figure 5-26. Case "A" Flow
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ADDRESSING
Figure 5-27. Case "B" Flow
Depending on the source of error or malfunction, certain events must occur.
In the event of a memory element failure, it must be determined what the contents
were, if the contents are recoverable, or if the data is available from other
sources, and what program restart steps are necessary. In the case of an I/O
failure, configuration control registers and the bus controller table must be up-
dated. If a CPU fails, other CPUs must be notified, and some form of analysis
of the intermediate results from that processor may be required. For bulk
memory failures, it is necessary to update the bulk memory allocation table.
Figures 5-29 through 5-32 show representative flows for the CPU, main memory,
the data acquisition path, and bulk memory. CPU time and memory estimated for
each are included in the figures.
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PROBLEM BETWEEN
DBC AND MEMORY
Figure 5-28. Case "C" Flow
5.1. 5. 5 Program Restart Software Sizing
Subsequent to the steps of detection, isolation, and reconfiguration, it is
necessary to resume program operation - ideally with nothing lost in the form of
data. Attempting program restart without loss of data necessitates even further
definition of the types of data inputs and of the baseline design.
The approach taken has been to define restart categories, assume one
category (a worst case) for implementation, assume a technique for restart,
define the system, generate the flows, and perform the sizing estimate. The
principal reason for assuming one design was that there were seven recovery
categories with six failure modes or 42 possible analyses that could be performed.
The case assumed was that a real-time data source was being used, that a failure
had-occurred in working storage, and that a checkpoint-/restart technique would be
utilized for recovery purposes.
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HI
ASSESS VALUE OF
WHAT PROCESSOR
WAS DOING.
CPU TIME = 200480 USEC.
MEMORY = 200 -100 WORDS
Figure 5-29. CPU Reconfiguration
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CPU TIME = 200 +80 USEC.
MAIN MEMORY = 200 + 100 WORDS
Figure 5-30. Main Memory Reconfiguration
5. 1. 5. 5. 1 Program Restart Categories - The various program restart cate-
gories arise due to variations in the character of data inputs, whether or not
intermediate results are useful and should be utilized in recovery, or whether it
is permissible to neglect past data and begin again. Seven restart categories are
discussed below.
* In this category, the program is driven by real-time data and inter-
arrival time between records, either explicitly or implicitly, forms
-pa-rt -of -the- input. -R-ecove-r-y --must -make--use--of-t-he--resu-lt-s-obt-a-ined when
the program last ran, the data which caused the latest execution, and the
time which has elapsed since the previous cycle.
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CHANGE STATUS IN
THE MEMORY
ALLOCATION TABLE.
CHANGE THE DBC/ CPU TIME
DBT/RDAU TABLE 36-4 USEC.
iI
CHANGECCRTO I MEMORY
INACTIVE 30 43 WORDS
Figure 5-31. Data Acquisition Reconfiguration
I
l
CPU TIME = 280 + An 420%
MEMORY = 80 8 WORDS
Figure 5-32. Bulk Memory Reconfiguration
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CHANGE STATUS IN
THE BULK MEMORY
ALLOCATION TABLE.
IDENTIFY CONTENTS
OF THE VOLUME.
IDENTIFY
RECOVERABLE
CONTENTS
ALLOCATE SPACE
FROM AVAILABLE
AREAS.
COPY DATA FROM
ALTERNATE SOURCES
UPDATE CCR
* The same as in the previous paragraph except that the inter-arrival
time is not a part of the program input.
* The program is driven by real-time data, but the results from previous
executions can be ignored for the purposes of restart. Two subsets of
this category would be where inter-arrival time is and is not significant
as part of the input.
* The program does not process real-time data, but it is advantageous
to be able to resume execution at some point other than the beginning of
the input stream because of the time required for program execution.
In this case, the intermediate results and the relative position in the
input stream are checkpointed.
* Program does not process real-time data. Restart consists of re-
positioning to the beginning of the input stream and rerunning the
program.
* The program processes real-time data, but it is not necessary to log
the data or to checkpoint the intermediate results. Restart consists of
first refreshing the program text and then beginning execution with the
first input event which occurs afterward.
* This is a degenerate category for programs which are terminated upon
failure of any resource being utilized. Restart is accomplished manually.
NOTES: 1. Whenever real-time data is being processed, it is assumed that
either the data rate or the program execution time is such that
"catch up" after recovery is possible.
2. It is also assumed that the program is "refreshable"; i. e.,
program instructions are kept separate from data and inter-
mediate results. It also is assumed that the program instructions
are never altered.
5. 1. 5. 5. 2 Restart Operation - For analysis purposes the worst case restart
category was assumed where real-time data was being processed, past results
were required, and inter-arrival time of data is significant. Figure 5-33 shows
a diagram indicating overall operation.
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BULK MEMORY
-- _-- COMMANDS
~-----* DATA FLOW
Figure 5-33. Diagram - Program Checkpoint and Data Logging Operation
In Figure 5-33, input data is via the Real-Time Data Source. The actual
program executing is redundantly stored in bulk memory. The input data is fed
to two places; i. e., to main working storage and to a data log (also in bulk
memory). This is a temporary storage area for data between checkpoints (data
log also occurs redundantly for recovery purposes). A checkpoint supervisor
will cause intermediate results in working storage to be transferred to the redun-
dant checkpoint log, under program control. If a failure occurs in the main
program, reconfiguration will occur, the program text will be read into the new
memory unit, intermediate results from the last checkpoint are read into working
storage, and data from the last checkpoint will be utilized from the data log until
the processor "catches up. "
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The sequence described represents that for a failure in a main storage unit
containing an application program. For other failures there will be a somewhat
different sequence. The failures which should be considered include:
(a) Main store unit containing program
(b) Main store unit containing working storage
(c) Processor failure
(d) Storage device containing data log
(e) Storage device containing checkpoint log
(f) Storage device containing program text
The actual sizing analysis has considered (a) only, but it is assumed that the
other five failure modes will be approximately equivalent to (a) in complexity.
Figure 5-34 shows a flow and sizing estimate for the sequence described previously.
Another aspect of program restart is the maintenance of continuity of oper-
ational data. This could be a failure external to the computer (e. g., within a bus
controller, terminal, RDAU, or within bulk storage itself). Figures 5-35 and 5-36
are flows indicating how the data logs would be utilized during an unexpected inter-
rupt emanating from an RDAU and from an attempt to read a record from a log
which has failed.
5. 1. 5. 6 Blocks and Tables
Maintaining configuration control, performing schedules, recovery, and
failure verification, etc., imply several tables. There must be a table for device
addresses down to the test point level, tables providing information on data paths,
tables for scheduling the frequency of performing COM tests, failed item tables,
memory allocation tables, a directory table to determine where the other tables
are located, etc. The following is a preliminary list and sizing estimate for the
blocks and tables assumed in this design. It also has been assumed that all tables
must be redundantly stored.
5. 1. 5. 6. 1 Device Address Table - A table must be maintained for addresses
down to the RDAU channel. The table should indicate (1 bit position) whether the
primary or secondary data path should be used.
Memory = 4000 test points x 32 bits address = 8K words
-Redundancy = -8K words
Total = 16K words
5-57
DEVICE ACCESS TIME = 75 MSEC.
I/O TIME = 156t78 MSEC.
CPU TIME = 254*80 USEC.
MEMORY = 112 *18 WORDS
EXIT
Figure 5-34. Program Restart Flow
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EXIT
Figure 5-35. Log Supervisor 1
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Figure 5-36. Log Supervisor 2
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5. 1. 5. 6. 2 Data Path Table - This table indicates what bus controller, terminal,
and RDAU are "on-line, " what their addresses are, and whether they are opera-
tional, failed, under test, etc.
DATA PATH BLOCK
RELATIVE PRIMARY POINTER SECONDARY POINTER
TEST POINT TO DEVICE TABLE TO DEVICE TABLE 3 WORDS
ADDRESS ENTRY ENTRY
Memory = 4000 test points x 3 words/block = 12K words
Redundancy = 12K words
Total = 24K words
5. 1. 5. 6.3 Limit Check Table - A copy of each RDAU memory must be main-
tained for each RDAU "read sequential. " Verify the RDAU limit check mode.
RDAU Memory = 76 bytes (19 words)
Memory for 133 RDAUs = 133 x 19 = 2527 words
Redundant storage = 2527 words
Total memory = 5054 words
5. 1. 5. 6. 4 Processor Table - This table identifies each processor. It indicates
the address of each processor's preferential storage area and the processor's
operational status.
Memory = 6 processors x 4 words/proc. = 24 words
Redundancy = 24 words
Total = 48 words
5. 1. 5. 6. 5 Switch Matrix LRU Table - This table translates point-to-point
switch matrix failures into LRU identification.
Total memory = 600 words (estimate)
5. 1. 5. 6. 6 Memory Allocation Table - This table indicates what main storage
LRUs are free, operational, under test, etc.
Memory = 22 LRUs x 4 words/block = 88 words
Redundancy = 88 words
Total = 176 words
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5. 1. 5. 6. 7 Rate Table - This table is used to initiate events such as the COM
tests which may occur at specified frequencies; e. g., once per 20 seconds, once
per hour, etc. A priority also must be stored with each event. For sizing pur-
poses, it is assumed that there may be 250 COM test events and 50 OCS executive
events and that each event has a 2 word block size.
EVENT At TIME OF LAST
IDENTIFICATION RATE INITIATION, t WORDS
32 BITS 16 BITS 16 BITS
Memory = 300 events x 2 words/block = 600 words
Redundancy = 600 words
Total = 1200 words
5. 1. 5. 6. 8 Repair Time Table - This table is utilized to assure (via crew
prompting) that the repair rate exceeds the failure rate. It will provide a time
in which a failed LRU should be replaced.
REPAIR TIME BLOCK
CONFIGURABLE ELEMT.
ID. (PROC., MEM, DBC, ALLOCATED REPAIR TIME 1 WORD
DBT, RDAU, ETC.)
Memory = 1 word/block x 12 blocks for DMS = 12 words
Redundancy = 12 words
Total = 24 words
.5. 1. 5. 6. 9 Failed Item Table - This table contains the configurable element
identification and the time at which the item failed. It is used in conjunction with
the repair time table to assure replacement.
FAILED ITEM BLOCK
CONFIGURABLE RELATIVE TIME OFELEMENT 2 WORDS
IDENTIFICATION SERIAL NO. FAILURE
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Memory = 2 words/block x 10 failure capacity = 20 words
Redundancy = 20 words
Total = 40 words
5. 1. 5. 6. 10 Auxiliary Storage Allocation Table - This table indicates the
utilization and availability of auxiliary storage.
PHYSICAL RECORD UNIT NUMBER OF STARTING
DATA SET NAME CHARACTERISTICS I )ADDRESS TRACKS TRACK 5 WORDS
10 BYTES 4 BYTES '2 BYTES 2 BYTES 2 BYTES
Memory = 200 data sets x 5 words/block = 1K words
Redundancy = 1K words
Total = 2K words
5. 1. 5. 6. 11 Directory Table - This table contains the locations of all tables.
For each table there is a double entry due to the redundant storage.
Total memory = 8K words (estimate)
5. 1. 5. 7 Executive Services
A three-level software hierarchy has been assumed in this design; i. e.,
there are individual application programs to check the various equipment within
the DMS, there is a checkout executive to perform test scheduling, event initiation,
and program restart, and there is a master executive to perform interrupt handling,
scheduling of I/O services, and overall task scheduling. The executive services of
the OCS and Master executives are:
* OCS Executive
- Provides asynchronous event initiation; i. e., starting a test at a
particular time to assure that the prescribed test rate is met.
- Provides "configuration control register" management for config-
uration control purposes.
- Initiation of tests in portions of the DMS which are outside the
operational -subset (i. e., in the experiment subset).
- Provides program restart categorization and restart services.
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* Master Executive Services
Provides I/O services with specific capabilities to start I/O (SIO),
test I/O (TIO), halt I/O (HIO), and test channel (TCH).
- Perform allocation of main storage resources.
- Perform allocation of auxiliary storage resources.
Provide processor-to-processor READ/WRITE direct communica-
tion via the data bus controller.
Perform dynamic storage allocation for "save" areas, working
storage, etc.
- Perform data logging function.
Provide checkpoints for storage of intermediate program results
for system recovery purposes.
5. 1. 5. 8 DMS Checkout Sizing Summary
Table 5-3 summarizes the sizing estimates for the various OCS items
discussed in previous sections. Some of the items had to be expressed in terms
of the number of bytes handled or transferred. To get absolute values for these
cases, further assumption would be required.
CPU times were calculated using estimates of the instructions needed to
perform each "block" in the flow chart of the program. The time requirements
of the instructions were then determined using timing formulas for models of the
IBM System/360 and System/4 Pi having similar instruction sets and architecture.
These processors had a memory cycle time of 2.5 usec; therefore, the results
were scaled by a factor of 1/2. 5 = 0. 4 to bring them into line with the baseline
processor characteristics, which included a memory cycle time of one micro-
second.
5.2 INTEGRATED TEST DEFINITION
The task of ensuring overall Space Station availability is primarily dependent
upon the proper structuring of individual subsystem tests. The ability to test the
subsystems independent of other subsystems is directly related to the number and
types of interfaces. As shown in Figure 5-37, the DMS and Electrical Power Sub-
systems (EPS) interface with every other Space Station subsystem. In addition,
the EC/LS Subsystem provides cooling to most of the electronic packages. This
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This situation demands that in constructing the test for a subsystem these inter-
faces be taken into account so that erroneous or ambiguous test results will not
be obtained. In other words, before detailed subsystem fault isolation tests are
initiated, a higher level of testing should be performed to verify that all interfaces
and Space Station conditions that influence the subsystem are proper. Properly
designed, these higher-level tests will (1) indicate what Space Station conditions
must be verified, maintained, or changed; (2) localize the' malfunction to a single
subsystem; and (3) identify the subroutine test necessary for fault isolation.
Since the DMS interfaces with all of the Space Station subsystems and is
used as the OCS, it would appear that all of the tests would be integrated. How-
ever, this is not a proper interpretation. When the DMS is used to verify the
performance of another subsystem, it must first establish itself as a test standard
against which the subsystem parameters are compared. Subsequent to this veri-
fication, the test is dedicated'to the evaluation of the subsystem. This test would
be considered as an independent test since the objective of the test was to verify
the subsystem and not the DMS. For a test to be considered as an integrated test
it must meet one or more of the following conditions:
e Test objectives associated with more than one subsystem
• Test involves subsystem interfaces
* Test requires proper operation of other subsystems
In several cases, the DMS must simultaneously perform the dual role of
OCS and functional elements. As an example, the DMS has a functional interface
with the GN&C and Prop Subsystems for the computation of guidance equations and
the execution of commands to the control actuators. When this functional closed
loop is being tested, the DMS must, in addition to performing its normal functions,
execute the test routine. For this type of integrated test there must be an intrinsic
relationship between the operational and test software. This relationship must be
carefully considered in structuring the integrated tests since unstable or inter-
mittent performance may be detected only in the exact operating mode under
closed-loop conditions. The number of integrated tests is not extensive due to the
approach of minimizing the different types of interfaces between Space Station sub-
systems. For example, interfaces between the DMS and other subsystems are
largely standardized. As a result, relatively common tests can be designed for
verification of the multitude of DMS subsystem interfaces or for localization of a
fault to one side of a DMS subsystem interface. All special integrated tests that
have been identified are discussed in the following paragraphs. The GN&C/DMS/
PROP configuration for navigation and attitude control poses the most difficult
problem for on-orbit testing so it is presented in significant detail. Other inte-
grated tests are summarized.
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5.2.1 GN&C/DMS/PROP
5.2.1.1 Block Diagram
Figure 5-38 shows the block diagram for the GN&C/DMS/PROP Subsystems
as configured for the zero g, horizontal mode of operation. The subsystems are
shown at the LRU level with all primary functional interfaces. For simplicity,
prime power inputs, cold plate interfaces, and mechanical or fluid connections
are not shown.
5. 2.1.2 Functional Description
The GN&C Subsystem accommodates both the artificial-g and zero-g opera-
tions of the Space Station. In the zero-g mode of operation, the GN&C Subsystem
provides autonomous navigation, rendezvous command, traffic control, automatic
docking, and stabilization and control of the Space Station.
The autonomous navigation scheme utilizes the stellar inertial reference
data and the automatic landmark tracker augmented with the drag accelerometer.
The navigation is accomplished by automatically tracking known and unknown land-
marks several times each orbit. The landmark is similar in operation and mech-
anization to a gimballed star tracker. The drag accelerometer accounts for
anomalies due to Space Station orientation and docked module changes which
contribute to navigation errors.
Both ground tracking and onboard subsystems will provide the navigation
information for the first year or so of the Space Station Program. The ground-
generated data will be transmitted onboard for evaluation of the autonomous
navigation system performance. As the confidence in autonomous operation is
increased through this parallel operation, the ground tracking is to be phased out.
In all operating modes and orientations, the gyros provide the high-frequency
rate and attitude information necessary to supplement the data from the stellar
sensors and the horizon sensors.
A more accurate Earth-centered reference is obtained in the horizontal
orientation through the use of the strapdown star sensors. The star sensors pro-
vide the long-term, drift-free inertial reference data while the gyros provide the
short-term, high-frequency attitude and rate information. The passive star sen-
sors are used while the Space Station is maintained in an Earth-centered
orientation. The constant rotational rate required of the vehicle to maintain this
type of orientation provides the scanning motion for the star sensors, which are
completely passive and provide no tracking or scanning capability of their own.
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Figure 5-38. GN&C/DMS/PROP Configuration for Zero-G Horizontal Mode
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The sensors themselves provide inertial attitude data which is transformed into
Earth-centered attitude information by use of the navigation parameters. By this
method, both inertial attitude and Earth-centered attitude are derived from the
passive star sensors while the vehicle is in the horizontal or other Earth-centered
orientation. This Earth-centered orientation is considered to be most responsive
to experiment and subsystem requirements.
Primary attitude control actuation is provided by control moment gyros
(CMGs). A CMG configuration utilizing four double-gimballed CMGs, each having
a momentum capacity of 1, 100 ft-lb-sec, was selected for the isotope/Brayton-
powered Space Station. Both High and Low-Thrust Propulsion Systems are
utilized by the GN&C Subsystem for CMG desaturation and backup attitude control
capability. The reaction jet control buffer provides the interface with the
Propulsion Subsystem.
The DMS provides the link between the sensors, which are used to determine
the vehicle angular position, and the actuators, which are used to maintain or
change the vehicle angular position. The use of the DMS provides the flexibility
required during both the development and operational phases to accommodate the
total Space Station Program objectives. The DMS performs the data processing
necessary for all guidance, navigation, and attitude control functions. The inter-
face electronics controls the flow of information from the sensors to the DMS and
converts all sensor inputs to a standardized format before the inputs are trans-
ferred. The interface electronics performs a similar function for output informa-
tion from the DMS to the control actuators.
5.2.1.3 Test Flow
The test flow for the GN&C/DMS/PROP configuration is shown in Figure
5-39. The flow demonstrates the technique for malfunction detection, subsystem
localization and fault isolation to the LRU. For simplicity some tests associated
with prime power, mode commands and cold plate temperatures are omitted. It
is assumed that in programming the actual tests these types of measurements will
be implemented as standard procedure. In the same vein, detailed tests of the
DMS are not shown. Again, it is assumed that the final procedure would contain
the necessary self-test, command verification, and other checks to maintain
confidence in DMS performance throughout the test.
Many of these test sequences will be repeated for different channels of data
or for identical sets of equipment. The test flow does not show the repetition of
these tests but indicates the need for them. For example, there are four control
moment gyros (CMGs). The flow shows a typical test for one CMG. It-should be
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Figure 5-39. GN&C/DMS/PROP Integrated Test Flow (Sheet 1 of 4)
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Figure 5-39. GN&C/DMS/PROP Integrated Test Flow (Sheet 2 of 4)
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Figure 5-39. GN&C/DMS/PROP Integrated Test Flow (Sheet 4 of 4)
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pointed out that although the detail test sequence will be identical for all CMGs,
the absolute value of the parameters such as torque commands, gimbal position,
gimbal, rates will be different for all CMGs. In some cases, the test flow ter-
minates in an instruction for the DMS to check data transfer. This instruction
is intended to include all operations necessary to verify that the DMS is function-
ing as required to support the operational and test routine.
5.2.2 GN&C/DMS/COMM
The DMS has a functional interface with the GN&C and COMM Subsystems
for the pointing and control of antennas. The GN&C sends navigation and attitude
information to the DiS which in turn uses it to compute antenna pointing positions
and slewing rates. Once computed, the DMS transfers these commands to the
antenna actuators in the Communication Subsystem.
Localizing a malfunction to one of the three subsystems will be performed
in a manner similar to that described in subsection 6. 2. 1. The DMS will verify
receipt of proper attitude and navigation data from the GN&C Subsystem, check
its capability to operate on and transform the data into appropriate antenna
commands, and verify the transmission of the control data to the Communication
Subsystem. Verification of proper response and operation of Communication Sub-
system equipment will be aided by the switching and use of redundant transmitters
and receivers.
5.2.3 DMS/EPS
The DMS has a power management interface with the Electrical Power Sub-
system. This function primarily includes start-up, control and shutdown of the
power conversion equipment, and the control and reconfiguring of the power pro-
file through the distribution buses. Fault isolation is performed by a DMS self-
check that verifies proper generation and transmission of control functions to the
interface.
The startup, control, and shutdown of the power conversion'equipment by
the DMS is another example of the integral relationship that must exist between
the operational and test software. For example, in starting the Isotope/Brayton
System the automatic operational procedure must contain exact instructions for a
normal start and an additional set of instructions for aborting or safing an ab-
normal start. To know the starting sequence (operational software) is not pro-
ceeding as planned implies a knowledge of what is wrong (test software). Based
upon this knowledge the DMS can execute the appropriate operational controls and
identify the malfunctioning element.
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Section 6
SOFTWARE
6.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The recommended software checkout startegy involves a sequence of
detecting faults, isolating faults to a failing LRU or LRUs, and reconfiguring the
system to continue operation while the failures are being repaired.
This recommendation was developed by evaluating each subsystem with
respect to the three general requirements of fault detection, fault isolation, and
reconfiguration.
Fault detection incorporates both the recognition of failure occurrence, and
the prediction of when a failure can be expected to occur. The Remote Data
Acquisition Units (RDAUs) continually check selected test point measurements
against upper and lower limits, and notify the executive on an exception basis when
a limit is exceeded. This approach avoids occupying the central multi-processor
with the low-information task of verifying that measurements are within limits.
Trend analysis is a fault detection technique recommended for predicting the
time frame during which a failure can be anticipated. Data is acquired on a basis
of time or utilization, and compared with previous history to determine if a "trend"
toward degraded performance or impending failure can be detected.
Another checkout requirement evaluated for each subsystem is periodic
testing. This type of test is provided to exercise specific components at extended
time intervals or prior to specific events, to assure operational integrity. In the
event that a failure is detected, the periodic test will isolate to the failing Line
Replaceable Unit (LRU) and accomplish recertification after a repair operation.
Calibration of specific subsystem components will be required periodically,
or subsequent to a repair and/or replace operation. The techniques involved are
unique to the individual component; and, in some cases, require the acquisition of
operational data.
Fault isolation is required when a fault is detected. When a particular fault
provides an indication that a life critical failure has occurred, the fault isolation
routines are automatically initiated. If the failure does not represent an immediate
danger to the vehicle occupants, the crew is notified and they will initiate the fault
isolation modules at their convenience.
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The basic requirements of the fault isolation function is to analyze the avail-
able information relevant to a problem, and identify the LRU which is responsible
for the anomaly.
Three basic approaches to meeting this requirement were considered. These
are:
e Analyze each fault as an independent problem
e Analyze each fault with a state matrix which defines the possible error
states of the subsystem
* Associate each fault with a specific subsystem, and evaluate that
subsystem in detail
The third approach was selected on a basis of software commonality and cost
effectiveness. The complexity associated with the testing can be reduced by locali-
zation of the logic associated with the analysis of the subsystem in a unique package.
The software commonality will result in reduced software development and main-
tenance costs, while increasing the reliability of the software.
The fault isolation software is structured modularly for compatibility with
the hardware structure of the subsystem. Checkout modules evaluate the per-
formance of a specific portion of the subsystem. A convenient division for this
modular structure is at the assembly level or functional area. A program module
which can determine and control the sequence in which these checkout modules are
executed is also required for each subsystem.
Subsequent to fault detection, the software associated with the subsystem
which is most likely to contain the error will be activated.
The subsystem software will analyze the error indication, and initiate a
sequence of checkout modules to isolate the problem. If successful, the crew is
notified regarding the Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) to be replaced. If an error
cannot be identified, the crew is informed of the situation and has an option to
execute the periodic test of the subsystem.
After a fault has been isolated, reconfiguration software restores the
functional capability of the subsystem. This is most commonly accomplished by
exchanging a redundant element for the failing unit, or by defining an alternate
path to accomplish the required function.
The Task 2 Final Report of the basic onboard checkout techniques study pro-
vides descriptions of the software requirements, definitions and design in addition
to detailed flow charts of specific checkout routines. The Data Management
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Subsystem software descriptions given herein focus on language and executive
requirements since individual subsystem software requirements are described in
the other volumes of this set.
6.2 LANGUAGE AND EXECUTIVE REQUIREMENTS
After analyzing each subsystem in regard to checkout strategy requirements,
the area of language requirements was approached. The flowcharts which were
developed for selected subsystem components during the development of the check-
out strategy were a significant input to this activity. These flowcharts were ex-
panded and analyzed to define the type of operations required to accomplish check-
out, and the language elements which could most efficiently meet these requirements.
The baseline elements and associated options were evaluated on a basis of
the ease and efficiency with which they could meet the logical, I/O, and arithmetic
operations required to accomplish automated on-board checkout, within the con-
straints established during the preliminary phase of the task. The elements which
were selected are summarized and are described in detail in Section 3 of the Task 2
Final Report.
Concurrently with the analysis of language elements for each subsystem, the
executive requirements which were associated with each element also received
consideration.
6.2. 1 PROGRAM SIZING
Each subsystem was also reviewed to provide software sizing estimates for
processor time, I/O time, and memory requirements. Table 6-1 refects a
summary of the estimates which would be typical to perform a periodic test on
each subsystem.
A significant conclusion which can be drawn from this table is that automated
on-board checkout with remote limit checking, will require minimal processor
time, and that run time of the program will be highly dependent upon the efficiency
of the I/O interface.
6.2.2 SUBSYSTEM SOFTWARE DEFINITION
The analysis of each subsystem resulted in the preparation of preliminary
design definitions describe the software which would typically be used to accomplish
the checkout of each subsystem. Data for each subsystem includes:
* A description of the required software modules
* Interface descriptions
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* Language requirements
* Executive requirements
* Program sizing
These documents were developed as the study progressed, and are included
in Appendices A through E of the Task 2 Final Report for each subsystem to pro-
vide background for the overall conclusions.
Table 6-1. Subsystem Periodic Test Characteristics
6.3 EXECUTIVE REQUIREMENTS
The incorporation of a multi-level executive, consisting of a Master Execu-
tive and an Onboard Checkout Executive, is recommended because of its adapta-
bility to modularization of the required program functions. This concept contributes
to the simplification of the definition and control of the program modules.
The significance of program modularization is in its contribution to reducing
the logical complexity of the system by providing clear decisions of responsibility.
The position of a program module in a hierarchical structure is based upon its
functional responsibility and the extent of supervisory influence which it exerts.
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Time (Minutes) Memory Words)
Subsystem CPU I/O TOTAL Main Aux.
Propulsion
Low Thrust .010 2. 649 2. 659 6K 8. 5K
High Thrust .015 4. 745 4. 760 5K 1OK
RF Communications .025 5. 024 5. 049 13. 5K 20K
Guidance Naviagation .022 3. 004 3. 026 12K 12K
and Control
Electrical Power
Isotope/Brayton .021 3. 310 3. 331 15K 15K
Solar Array .042 5. 302 5. 344 15K 15K
EC&LS .020 4. 580 4. 600 16K 33K
Structure .005 2.913 2. 918 4. 5K 4K
Figure 6-1 depicts the major hierarchical levels and associated interfaces
in the executive structure recommended by this study.
The determination of Executive System requirements was approached by
defining seven general areas of executive functional responsibility, and categorizing
each identified requirement. Once the requirements were identified and categorized,
it was necessary to determine the hierarchical level at which each specific require-
ment could best be accomplished on a basis of programming and run time efficiency.
The specific areas of functional responsibility which were established are:
* Scheduling
* Support Services
* System Communication
* Resource Allocation
* Data Handling
* System Recovery
* Interruption Servicing
DATA
BASE
Figure 6-1. Multi-Level Executive Relationships
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6.3.1 SCHEDULING
A task is a unit of work for the DMS multiprocessor; and task scheduling is
the executive function which controls the flow of work. A multiprogrammed sched-
uling function is recommended for the space station multiprocessor configuration
to permit concurrent execution of two or more tasks. A priority dispatching
technique will select the tasks on a basis of their relative importance to the opera-
tional objectives of the system.
This strategy utilizes task priority level, memory requirements, and
estimated execution time to select tasks, initiate and control task execution, and
terminate task execution. This strategy provides the required time and event of
oriented scheduling capabilities. The initiation of programs on a time oriented
basis is required for the trend analysis and selected periodic check routines.
Event oriented scheduling requirements include the initiation of critical fault isola-
tion sequences, and programs which are requested by the crew.
6.3.2 SUPPORT SERVICES
The services of an executive program are primarily concerned with providing
the software to meet the requirements for program generation and maintenance.
The executive support services required as a minimum to support the recommended
high-level language include an interpreter and a compiler.
A compiler program, which will execute in both an on-line and off-line en-
vironment, will process the source statements and build the appropriate data list
tables. An interpreter program will process the data lists and execute the asso-
ciated operations.
Another system requirement which is defined in this functional area involves
the initialization of the system. The software required to accomplish this must
contain the logic required to determine the assignment of the multiprocessor to
either the operational or experiment functional areas.
6.3.3 SYSTEM COMMUNICATION
The functional area of system communication is integral to the establishment
of an efficient man-machine interface. This application requires an executive
program to provide the interface between the operator and computer system through
a keyboard/display.
The language used to accomplish this interface with the computer is commonly
referred to as job control, or command language. The executive interprets the
inputs and initiates the designated activity.
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Specific requirements identified relative to the execution of checkout applica-
tion programs include:
* The capability to provide variable data to a program at both load and
execution time.
* The ability to specify options to control the sequence of program
operation.
* Permit manual response to a detected error situation.
- Retest
- Terminate
* Require operator concurrence prior to issuing specific stimuli.
6.3.4 RESOURCE ALLOCATION
The function of resource allocation is responsible for minimizing interference
which can result when concurrent tasks share the same resources. The efficient
allocation of memory, external devices, and the data base will reduce the processor
time which is lost due to memory contention, and the delays associated with input/
output operations.
Memory allocation is responsible for determining the memory currently avail-
able for allocation to new tasks, and memory which is already in use. The effects
of memory contention can be minimized by a strategy which allocates unique
memory modules to concurrent requirements. The memory allocation strategy
should also minimize the effect of memory fragmentation by evaluating the total
memory which is unavailable due to fragmentation, and reassign memory only when
system performance is being impacted.
The function which allocates subsystem resources is particularly important to
the On-Board Checkout System. It is essential that interference be eliminated be-
tween concurrent requirements. An example of this interference would be an
attempt to initiate the periodic test for a subsystem which is currently performing
a necessary operational function. These considerations prevent the use of a sub-
system or component by a program whose requirements could conflict with the
current operation of the subsystem. Executive modules which provide this capa-
bility must maintain information relative to the current use of each subsystem com-
ponent where the possibility of-interference exists; -and must assure -that two con-
flicting requests are not issued.
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This study recommends that the allocation of equipment (displays, printers,
and subsystems), be accomplished using a priority queuing technique which would
sequence requests to insure that the tasks access the equipment on a non-interference
basis, and in consideration of their relative priorities rather than arrival order.
6.3.5 DATA HANDLING
The data handling capabilities of the executive must support the system re-
quirements for acquisition, routing, and retention of information. In a multi-
processor environment, tables will be updated by one processor and used by
another. Precautions are required to prevent one processor from accessing a
particular table while it is being updated by a second processor. Specific require-
ments which have been identified to be incorporated into a data base are as follows:
* System Status
* System Configuration
* Redundant elements and paths
* Schedules and procedures
* Inventory control
· Association of symbolic test points with physical addresses
* Program modules
The data base concept which is recommended to meet these extensive and
varied requirements involves hierarchical relationships between the specific data
which must be retained, with responsibility for operations on the data base vested
in an executive function, instead of with application programs. This permits
control to be maintained in a central routine, with the result that data base integrity
is enhanced.
Techniques are required to handle the exchange of data between programs
and between external equipment. The functional capabilities which are required in
this area are:
* Exchange of data
* Recognition of the receipt of data and source identification
* Routing of data for subsequent processing or retention
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These functions are commonly accomplished by the executive input/output
(I/O) routines which provide the interface between the application programs and the
external I/O devices. In general, the functional capability which is required in the
executive system to assure compatibility with this design concept includes:
* Transfer of data between subsystems and the computer.
* Identification of the specific subsystem.
* Analysis (limit checking, compaction) of the data.
* Presentation of messages on display units.
* Test point measurement.
* Issuance of stimuli to test points.
When errors occur in the equipment they must be analyzed, and the appro-
priate response taken. This action, dependent upon the problem, includes a subset
of the following items:
* Return error analysis information to the program which requested the
I/O operation.
* Maintain error statistics.
* Reset the I/O device.
* Retry the operation.
* Notify the operator.
* Initiate recovery procedures
In addition to the above, the inclusion of special processing routines to meet
the data retention requirements of trend analysis, data logging, and checkpointing
is required for the Space Station application. These requirements will necessitate
allocating areas of auxiliary storage to hold the data, and periodically deleting data
which is no longer required.
6.3.6 SYSTEM RECOVERY
The functional area of system recovery relates to the capability of the space
station subsystems to remain operative in the presence of failures. The primary
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responsibility in this area involves the analysis of a failure, and reconfiguring the
system to reduce the impact of the problem. Specific requirements related to this
area include configuration management, redundancy control, and the interface to
assure that the checkpointing of data is accomplished.
Redundancy control refers to DMS control and accountability of system ele-
ments which are redundant. It is essential that the DMS have the ability to alternate
redundant elements between primary and secondary status, in order to assure
operational readiness.
Configuration management routines establish and maintain the information
which provides the current system organization description required for redundancy
control.
The functional area of system recovery is also responsible for assuring that
timely checkpointing of the appropriate data is occurring.
System recovery is also responsible for coordination of program termination
when required, prior to successful completion of an application program. This
function must assure that any subsystem elements which may have been affected by
the program are restored to a proper configuration prior to continuation of other
system operations.
6.3.7 INTERRUPTION SERVICING
The real time response requirements of the space station environment are
particularly adaptable to interruption servicing. The interruption servicing routine
performs the following functions:
* Save machine status (i. e., processor status, register contents) at the
point of interruption.
* Identify the interruption source and type.
* Select and execute the appropriate program module.
* Restore machine status and return to the interrupted program.
Specific requirements identified by this study relative to on-board checkout
relate primarily to responses to out-of-tolerance indications which are received
from the RDAU's. Special emphasis is required to analyze multiple failure indica-
tions. The study focuses attention on the problems encountered as the result of an
error whose effect will impact other areas. When this situation occurs, measure-
ments associated with downstream components will exceed tolerance limits. These
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measurements must be evaluated to determine if they are within the scope of the
original problem, or represent a unique problem.
The approach which is currently considered appropriate is to disable the
RDAU limit check capability, thus eliminating repetitive interruptions. The RDAU
scan of those test points which could normally be expected to exceed limits in view
of the detected error, is also disabled. When the fault isolation sequences have
successfully isolated the problem and repair has been accomplished, limit checking
is reinitiated.
6.4 EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
The Space Station Executive is a program which supports the on-board check-
out functions of status monitoring, fault isolation, reconfiguration, periodic check,
calibration, and trend analysis. The requirements of the Master Executive are to
service interruptions, provide an interface between hardware and other programs,
allocate the processor resource of DMS to tasks on a priority basis, and serve as
a repository for routines which have common usage among higher-level executives
such as the OCS Executive and the Experiment Executive.
6.4.1 MULTI-LEVEL APPROACH
The executive design is a multi-level one in that functions are stratified with
regard to their scope of use. At the lowest level are functions which provide the
interface with hardware devices such as the data bus controller. All on-board pro-
grams being executed by the multiprocessor make use of the low-level functions,
regardless of whether they are checkout oriented or not. Low-level executive ser-
vices are normally used by the higher level functions, rather than directly by the
application programs.
The lower levels of the executive are referred to as the Master Executive
because of the central control and interface with the DMS hardware which they pro-
vide. The upper levels of the executive are oriented toward individual system of
the Space Station; therefore the OCS Executive functions are generally found in the
upper levels of the hierarchy.
Portions of the OCS Executive reside in main storage, and are closely aligned
with the Master Executive routines because of their frequency of use. From the
standpoint of how processor control is given to certain OCS routines, these routines
are indistinguishable from some of the Master Executive routines; however, they
are categorized as OCS routines because their function has no wider application
than on-board checkout.
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6.4.2 CENTRALIZATION VS. DECENTRALIZATION
In order to perform detection, isolation, and reconfiguration in an integrated
and autonomous checkout system, a centralized data base is required to achieve
coordination. There appears to be no trade involved in the area of whether to
centralize or decentralize that portion of the DMS which fulfills the coordination
function.
If it was desirable to disperse DMS functions as much as possible, the mini-
mum which would require centralization would be a configuration table reflecting
the logical relationships among assemblies of the Space Station. Shared auxiliary
storage could be used to contain the configuration table. However, by centralizing,
definite advantages relating to equipment utilization and operational capability can
be realized.
From the standpoint of equipment utilization, more efficient use of equipment
can be achieved in a centralized configuration because other functions can be per-
formed during those intervals when a decentralized arrangement would produce
idle time.
From the standpoint of retaining operational capability when a failure occurs,
a centralized arrangement can be reconfigured to supply redundant idle components
to serve in place of the failed item; and, the switch can be made automatically.
Preprocessors in the GNC Subsystem provide an example of the effect of de-
centralization. The optical navigation/attitude preprocessor serves to control the
operation of five GNC assembly categories. Failure of an LRU in the preprocessor
results in loss of capability with regard to the horizon detectors, attitude gyros,
horizon sensors, star sensors, and star trackers; a total of nine required and one
standby-redundant assemblies. If operational control were vested in the centralized
multiprocessor, loss of one of the processors would affect only the function being
performed at the instant of failure. Other functions would continue normally. The
lost function might be recovered automatically in the centralized environment.
However, in a decentralized environment, all the above functions would be lost
until manual remove-and-replace activity could be effected.
6.5 MASTER EXECUTIVE DESIGN
The Master Executive is designed to perform the following:
* Handle interruptions
* Supervise tasks
* Control programs in main storage
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· Control the Data Management Subsystem itself
* Supervise the interval timers of all processors
* Supervise the interface with man via display units
* Handle data logging
* Handle checkpointing
* Supervise exiting and termination procedures
The functions of the Master Executive are:
* Scheduling
* Support Services
* System Communications
* Resource Allocation
* Data Handling
* System Recovery
* Interruption Servicing
The Master Executive will perform multiprogramming; that is, fulfill two or
more separate programming requirements concurrently by making decisions based
on various conditions in the Data Management Subsystem. Therefore, it is a goal
of executive design that modules will be reenterable. The reenterable attribute is
ascribed to a program which is used concurrently in the performance of two or
more tasks. The design of the Master Executive is such that it can perform its
functions while being used by more than one processor in the DMS multiprocessor.
The basic service of the Master Executive is to provide an interface between
software and hardware. In doing so, it enables programs to be largely independent
from an evolving hardware environment.
The Master Executive serves to reduce redundant software development and
reduce maintenance activ-iti-es which a-rise in a dispersed design, by -serving as a
repository for common functions. Any function having multiple uses across systems
(e. g., experiment, checkout), is designed with common interfaces and supplied as a
service of the Master Executive.
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6.5.1 SCHEDULING
The flow of processor control through the Master Executive is shown in
Figure 6-2. Processor control is passed to the Master Executive via an interrup-
tion such as supervisor call, I/O, timer, program, or machine check. Any inter-
ruption causes processor control to be taken from the interrupted program and
given to an interruption handling routine of the Master Executive. The interruption
handling routines analyze the requirements for servicing the interruption; and, as
a result, may pass control to one of the task specification routines which define a
new task and record it in the task queue. The task queue is that portion of the data
base containing the identity and characteristics of work being performed by the
multiprocessor. After the task specification routine returns control to the interrup-
tion handling routine, or in the case where no new tasks are required, control is
passed to the processor allocation routine which examines the task queue and
chooses the highest priority task which is ready for execution. Control is then
passed to this task. If no ready tasks are available, the processor is placed in a
"wait" status until another interruption causes the above procedure to be repeated.
The task specification module determines the selection and priority of the
tasks to be executed. The task specification function must recognize a request to
execute a task, obtain and store enough information for the task to be initiated,
and indicate when the task is ready for execution. Task specification identifies,
locates, and evaluates in conjunction with the existing job mix, and specifies the
order in which processors are to be allocated to each task.
Tasks are recorded in the data base of the Master Executive as a series of
elements in the task queue, and ordered as to their priority. The elements record
the task states of ready, waiting, and active, as appropriate, so that any processor
can examine the queue and determine the highest priority task which is ready for
processing. The ready state signifies that execution of the task can resume as
soon as possible. The waiting state signifies that execution of the task must be
suspended until the completion of a specific operation such as data transfer from
the data bus. The active state signifies that a processor is currently engaged in
executing the task.
The logic paths in the Master Executive are brought together into the pro-
cessor allocation routine, which either selects the task which should next be exe-
cuted, or enters the wait state, if all tasks are active or waiting. This results in
a high service attention for tasks in the system.
A distributive task scheduling technique is used because the effects of pro-
cessor or memory failure can be controlled in such a way that the failure does not
disable the entire system. In most cases, remaining elements of DMS can continue
to function in a normal way while corrective action and recovery is taking place.
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Figure 6-2. Master Executive Scheduling
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The distributive technique allows any processor to execute any DMS task which is
ready. As a result, during the lifetime of a task, it will receive the services of
several different processors as the task states cycle through the normal sequence
of ready, active, and waiting. The distributive technique eliminates the problems
of interchanging master and slave roles, while utilizing more of each processor's
potential.
Programs are scheduled to be initiated by the following means:
* By the crew or ground using the execute element of the high level
language
* By the routine which handles timer interruptions
* By the routine which logs real-time data
r By other programs using either the execute or the call elements of the
high level language
Program initiation is performed in the following steps:
a. Bring in program characteristics table
b. Verify that the parameters required by the program are available
c. Allocate memory and other DMS resources required by the program
d. Fill out or complete the program characteristics table
e. Format the working storage used by the program
f. Give control to the program
If the crew or ground requests a checkout program be executed, and one or
more of the DMS LRU's required are inactive, an indication is received that the
executive is unable to allocate from available resources.
6.5.2 SUPPORT SERVICES
In contrast to the in-line services of the Master Executive which are obtained
when an interruption occurs, the support services operate as separate tasks.
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6. 5.2. 1 Language Support
The language support services of the Master Executive consist of a compiler
which organizes language statements into data lists, an interpreter which processes
the data lists as a program, and a library of routines which provide detailed func-
tions to support the compiler and the interpreter.
6.5.2.1. 1 Compiler
Since the high level language is used for system communication as well as
programming, the compiler is provided to transform keyboard entries into data
lists for efficient processing by the interpreter. The compiler is used for batch
processing of language stored on card, tape, or direct access media, as well as
for real-time processing of keyboard entries. The data lists which are prepared
during the batch process are stored in a compact form for later processing by the
interpreter.
When used in the real-time mode, the compiler keeps a low profile in main
storage by using overlay techniques which load only the compiler modules needed
for the element being processed. As soon as a data list is formed from one language
statement, control is given to the interpreter for actual processing.
From the keyboard user's standpoint, there is both a define and an execute
mode of the language. When the compiler is in the execute mode, language state-
ments, consisting of elements and modifiers, are passed to the interpreter one-by-
one, as they are entered from the keyboard. The interpreter performs the speci-
fied operations and returns results, or status to the user in a conversational
manner.
When the compiler is in the define mode, the data lists from language state-
ments are accumulated until the user commands that the execute mode be entered.
Transition between modes is effected by the BEGIN and the END language elements.
6. 5.2.1. 2 Interpreter
In general, an analysis of two or more programs written in a high-level
language reveals a high degree of redundancy in the instructions which have been
prepared for execution by the language translator. These programs may differ only
in the parameters or data lists which are to be processed by the instructions. By
removing the executable instructions from the high-level language programs and
consolidating them in an interpreter, a savings in main storage results from the
elimination of the redundancy. I-n-addition, the -data lists which now -comprise the
program can be made independent of the main storage addresses actually used to
store the program during execution.
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For the Space Station multiprocessor with shared main memory, the above
characteristics result in more efficient use of main storage by eliminating redun-
dant instructions which might otherwise appear in concurrent tasks. In addition,
should a memory LRU fail, the programs in the LRU can be relocated without
having to be restarted. A disadvantage in consolidating the executable instructions
is the increase in memory contention, which results when several processors use
the same set of instructions in the interpreter.
Two or more tasks are concurrently processed by the interpreter as a result
of storage allocation and interpreter design techniques. The interpreter uses a
block of main storage allocated to the program for storing the data required in the
interpretation process, and the data required by the program itself. The inter-
preter routines are made reenterable by this storage technique. The reenterable
attribute allows use of a routine by subsequent tasks, prior to the time when the
initial task completes its use. For example, the interpreter routine which pro-
cesses the MEASURE element for Task A may start an I/O operation and be wait-
ing for its completion when Task B requires use of the MEASURE routine. Since
working storage is used for all changes, Task B may enter the routine before Task
A leaves it, thus decreasing the time spent waiting for task processing.
The interpreter provides general processing, such as recognition of the
language element represented in the data list, and passing processor control to the
appropriate library routine for detailed processing. The interpreter also controls
the loading of non-resident library routines from auxiliary storage into a transient
area of main storage.
6. 5. 2.1. 3 Library Routines
Library routines of the language support services provide detailed processing
necessary for the language elements. Depending on their frequency of use, they
may be stored in auxiliary storage and transferred to main storage as required, or
kept in main storage. Principal services provided by the language support library
are as follows:
* Symbolic Test Point Translation - permitting hardware-independent
development and multiple use of program modules. (See Figure 6-3).
* Data Handling - employing a data base definition, storage, and accessing
technique for both the high-level language programs and for the interpreter.
* Message Assembly - permitting concise language references to skelton
messages stored in the data base.
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* Arithmetic Processing - in support of the SOLVE element.
* Documentation and Debugging - to provide display, retrieval, and modi-
fication of programs; and, to provide facilities for tracing program
execution.
6. 5. 2.2 Time-Based Services
When large numbers of programs must be initiated repetitively on a scheduled
basis, a machine is a more reliable initiator than man. Examples of programs of
this type are those used for trend analysis, periodic checkout, and data path veri-
fication. To relieve crew or ground personnel from the burden of remembering
when to execute these tasks, a Master Executive routine called the Pacer is pro-
vided which sets the interval timer of a processor to a value which will cause a
timer interruption when initiation of a scheduled task is required. A flow chart of
the Pacer is shown in Figure 6-4.
6. 5. 2. 3 Utility Services
The utility services are provided by a collection of general purpose programs
which are used as required to aid man in establishing the data base, retrieving data,
and modifying the Rate Table used by the Pacer.
6. 5. 2. 4 System Initialization
The initialization procedure is invoked by crew or ground, and establishes the
division between processors used for operations and those used for experiments.
Initialization is invoked by a hardware command to one of the DMS processors.
Included as a parameter is the address of the auxiliary storage device which con-
tains the initialization program and the executive. Other processors are activated
by the first, using the processor-to-processor communications feature. The
initialization function determines the DMS configuration; loads the executive into
shared main storage; establishes the initial executive data base; and finally causes
each processor to execute pending tasks; or await further communication from
crew, ground, or data acquisition path.
6.5.3 SYSTEM COMMUNICATION
The system communication function of the Master Executive is designed to
enable man to obtain the services of the Master Executive; and, through those ser-
vices invoke the functions necessary to provide data processing for the on-board
subsystems. It is a design goal to implement the system communication function
within the structure of the high-level language, in order to minimize the amount of
"non-language" which man must know in order to make use of the Data Management
Subsystem.
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Entry in the Rate Table:
Event Identification
At t i + At At = period of initiation
,t. = time of last initiation
1
Figure 6-4. Pacer Logic Flow
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6.5.4 RESOURCE ALLOCATION
The allocation and use of resources function of the Master Executive is
primarily a supervisory one, and the routines that perform this function are collec-
tively referred to as the Supervisor. The routines of the supervisor control the
allocation and use of the processors, shared main storage, data bus controller,
data bus terminals, and other devices of the Data Management Subsystem. The
supervisory functions are as follows:
* Interrupt Supervision, which involves analysis using specific routines
to handle each type of interruption.
· Task Supervision, which is the recording of tasks currently in the Data
Management Subsystem, and their associated priorities, status, and
the programs they require.
* Shared Main Storage Supervision, which is the allocation and dealloca-
tion of various portions of shared main storage.
* Contents Supervision, which is the loading of programs into shared main
storage, and the recording of the characteristics of these programs for
use in allocation and recovery procedures.
* Timer Supervision, which is the setting and maintaining of the inter-
ruptable timers of all processors in the Data Management Subsystem.
Shared main storage in the DMS is allocated by the Master Executive based on
pre-defined program requirements, and requirements which arise during program
execution. In order that the effect of a memory failure may be assessed, a memory
table of contents is redundantly maintained in separate line replaceable units.
Programs are designed so that during execution, they may be moved about in
shared main storage to eliminate fragmentation of unused storage.
6.5.5 DATA HANDLING
When a task of the Data Management Subsystem requires data outside its own
working storage, it must use the data handling services of the Master Executive to
obtain that data. The reason for this is to control access to the data and resolve
possible conflicts. The data handling function of the Master Executive provides a
unified interface with using programs so that the data location (main storage or
auxiliary storage) is transparent to the programs.
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6. 5. 5.1 Capabilities
The principal rationale for providing extensive data handling capabilities for
the Space Station On-Board Checkout Subsystem is that an accurate account of
status and configuration must be maintained, at least down to the LRU level. Most
high-level language programs are involved indirectly in data handling; however, the
interface provided through the READ and WRITE language elements allows data
handling specifications to be made in general terms, consistent with the abilities of
the language in other areas. Operations such as indexing, buffering, physical
storage management, etc., are performed by executive routines. Data base defini-
tions are maintained external to either executive or checkout programs, in order
to provide a central reference for all routines gaining access to the data base.
6. 5. 5. 2 I/O Operations
The processing of I/O operations is divided into the processing required to
start the operation, and the processing which is required when the operation is
ter minated.
The use of a READ or a WRITE language element results in control being
passed to the language support services routine which determines what further
action should be taken. If an I/O operation is required, information required to
initiate the operation is gathered, and a supervisor call instruction is executed
which causes a supervisor call (SVC) interruption. The SVC interruption handler
of the Master Executive gives processor control to the I/O supervisor, which
either starts the I/O operation using the start I/O instruction, or enqueues the
operation if the data path is busy.
When the I/O operation terminates, an I/O interruption occurs causing pro-
cessor control to pass, first to the I/O interruption handler, and then to the I/O
supervisor which records the fact that the operation is completed in the table pro-
vided for that purpose by the routine which requested the operation (usually the
language support services routine). If an error is indicated, the appropriate error
handling routine is scheduled. The queues are examined to determine if another
I/O operation can be started on the data path prior to returning control to the inter-
ruption handler.
6. 5. 5. 3 Data Logging
Many potential sources for real-time data exist in the Space Station. In order
to respond to the unpredictable arrival of such data, the Master Executive provides
a logging and--reduction serv-ice which records the arrivalof real-_time data, and
performs preliminary compaction prior to logging.
6-23
FIni
w
,C,
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
zZ
L
II~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
L
Z 
0
UA4 Z.
J
O
~
~
~
~
~
g
,
I- 
I
4
V
.L
O
 1
'0
S
aI-o
z
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
ww
 
-
mlF~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C
0 
0
Co
I-.-
t -
z~
,,_
x/', 
.
~
F i 
tu
 
5.' "
 D
t Log
6-2
o
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
 
,
,
0( 
C)
to 
"
'
r
u
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
u
i,
Figure 6-5. 
D
ata Log
6-24
Programs which process real-time data may be scheduled for execution by
the arrival of the data, or the accumulation of a threshold quantity of data. The
executive service is designed so that processing does not lock out further arrivals;
and when no further data is available, the program is checkpointed so that main
storage may be used for other purposes.
Specific advantages can be gained in real-time systems which accept the ran-
dom arrival of data initiated by external devices, by providing routines to accom-
plish special analysis. Tolerance checking and data compaction typify such re-
quirements. Tolerance check routines compare the data with user specified values,
and the operator is notified only when limits are exceeded. The technique of com-
pressing data of like characteristics or values during real time processing reduces
the amount of time and space required for storage.
The log supervisor function of the Master Executive provides the following
services:
* Receiving, time stamping, and logging real-time data
* Initiating the program which processes the data
* Retrieving data from the log at the request of the program
The first service continues while the other two are in progress. Note that
the application program, not the log routine, coordinates transfer of data from the
log to the program for processing. The log routine is responsible for insuring that
the program is initiated. It is the program's responsibility to read the data by
requesting retrieval from the log supervisor. If no further data is available, the
log supervisor returns an indication to the effect to the program which may wait or
terminate, as appropriate.
It is the joint responsibility of the log supervisor and the restart supervisor
to record the progress made by the program in processing data in the log.
The association between the data source and the program required to process
it is pre-defined and recorded in the data base.
A fixed number of auxiliary storage tracks, divided into several segments,
are allocated for each log and used in a cycle as shown in Figure 6-5. The segments
contain groups of data which have arrived since a checkpoint of the program was
recorded. A log control block is used to record the segment boundaries, and main-
tain coordination with the associated checkpoints. Although the responsibility for
initiating checkpoint procedures lies primarily with the program, the log supervisor
will initiate a checkpoint if the latest segment begins to overlay the oldest segment.
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The Data Retention module is a function which must accomplish the retention
of data which will be required for analysis at a later time. This can be accomplished
by allocating areas of peripheral storage to hold the data, and periodically deleting
the data which is no longer needed.
6.5.6 SYSTEM RECOVERY
The system recovery function of the Master Executive is concerned with the
activities necessary to maintain a high level of DMS operating capability when a
DMS failure occurs. Reconfiguration is performed automatically by making use of
redundantly maintained tables which reflect the configuration of active and spare
elements at all times; and by changing the configuration control registers of the
hardware.
Malfunctions in the processors and in main storage are handled by the re-
covery management function and initiated by a machine check interruption. Fail-
ures in the data acquisition path are also handled by this function; however, initia-
tion is by way of the I/O interruption and subsequent analysis of associated status
indications. It is a goal of the recovery management function that system operation
may be permitted to continue even though failures have occurred that would other-
wise cause the system to stop. If normal retry procedures are unsuccessful, the
recovery management function automatically prohibits further use of the failed LRU,
so that system operation can be resumed in the remaining operative portion of
DMS. Recovery management then analyzes the effect of the failure, in order to
restart or recover those tasks which are affected.
Recovery from certain memory failures can be achieved by refreshing the
contents of the memory cell causing the problem. Separating program text from
working storage makes it possible to refresh a program module if a machine check
occurs during a reference to the instructions. Having working storage and instruc-
tions intermingled reduces the frequency with which this technique can be employed.
Since damage to certain infrequently used data management tables due to pro-
gram error, may go undetected for a time, a data base audit function is provided
to check the integrity of the data base periodically and after the failure of a memory
or processor-associated LRU. Programs which provide this function verify that
the relationships among components of the data base are correctly established, and
that conditions that exist in the hardware are accurately reflected in the data base.
Termination procedures must provide for both scheduled and unscheduled
termination of the activities of DMS software and hardware. It is a goal of the
termination process to enable a restart of the system without losing task continuity,
while providing a means for activities to be selectively resumed by crew or ground
specification.
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Providing for unscheduled termination increases system overhead. Several
methods are employed in existing ground-based systems, including checkpoint,
logging of changes, and emergency or backup power supplies. As Space Station
requirements evolve, trade studies in this area are indicated.
6.5.7 INTERRUPTION SERVICING
The interruption is the basic means by which hardware and programs obtain
the services of the Master Executive. For each type of interruption, a first level
routine exists to determine detailed requirements of the requested service and
route processor control to the appropriate executive routine.
The interruption is a demand to the Master Executive to recognize that an
event has occurred, and to consider that event when scheduling the processor
activity. While a keyboard interruption indicates that there is a console entry
which should be serviced, an alarm condition may indicate a system failure. It is
reasonable to assume that the alarm requires action of a relatively higher priority
than the keyboard.
The design of an interruption monitor is heavily dependent upon the hardware
interruption system in the computer. The software must complement the hardware
design while performing the following functions:
* Save machine status (processor status and register contents if needed)
at the point of interruption
* Identify the interruption source and type
* Select and execute the appropriate program module
* Restore machine status and return to the interrupted program
6.6 OCS EXECUTIVE DESIGN
The OCS Executive is designed to provide services which are unique to
checkout, and common to more than one subsystem. By locating such services
in the OCS Executive, redundant software development is avoided.
The OCS Executive consists of routines closely associated, or in line, with
the Master Executive, and routines which operate as separate tasks. The closely
associated routines are handled in the same way as the Master Executive's own
in-line routines in that they are resident with the Master Executive, or established
as transient routines. The separate task routines are invoked as needed by other
tasks which require their services.
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An example of a separate OCS Executive task is the utility which facilitates
RDAU memory management. An example of an in-line OCS Executive routine is
the second-level I/O interruption routine which verifies the limit check.
In the following paragraphs, the data base and the services of the Onboard
Checkout System Executive are discussed.
6. 6.1 DATA BASE
Operations of the OCS Executive are centered about a data base in which the
configuration and status of all Space Station assemblies are continuously maintained.
By storing the representation of the logical relationships which exist among
assemblies of the onboard subsystems, the data base provides the reference for
coordinating conflicting tasks. Hardware status can be determined without inter-
ruptingth~e active functions of the hardware in order to make tests, because the data
base is maintained in real-time by executive programs. Use of the data base by
both the Master and the OCS Executives results in more concise application pro-
grams, since the coordination procedures do not have to be provided in each program
module.
6.6.2 CHECKOUT SERVICES
The functions which are determined to be associated principally with check-
out, yet are not unique to a particular subsystem, are selected for implementation
in the OCS Executive. This choice does not restrict in any way the selection of
whether or not the high level language is used when programming these functions;
rather, the choice of language may be made based on suitability relative to the
specific application.
In the following paragraphs, OCS Executive services which support status
monitoring, fault isolation, reconfiguration, trend analysis, and checkout program
debugging are discussed.
6. 6. 2. 1 Status Monitoring
Although the continuous measurement of test point parameters and the com-
parison of their values to upper and lower limits is performed by the Remote Data
Acquisition Units RDAU, the OCS Executive plays an important role in status moni-
toring. When the I/O interruption handler detects an RDAU limit check, it passes
control to a module of the OCS Executive known as the RDAU Second-Level Inter-
ruption Handler. The function of this module is to verify that the RDAU limit check
is a proper one. This is done by accessing the RDAU memory contents stored in
shared main storage, and comparing them with the contents of the RDAU memory.
The test point which has gone out of limits is then read, and an in-storage limit
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check is performed to verify that the test point is out of tolerance. Upon verifica-
tion, the RDAU channels which read that test point are then masked to prevent
further interruption until analysis is complete. The identity of the RDAUs involved
are placed on a restore queue so that, after analysis is complete and the failure is
corrected, the RDAU limit-checking mode can be re-instituted.
A functional flow chart of the Second-Level Interruption Handler is shown in
Figure 6-6. Prior to passing control to the subsystem fault isolation routine, an
analysis is made to determine whether the test point is out of limits is within the
scope of a fault isolation task already in progress. If this is the case, then no
further action is taken. If the test point is not within the scope of existing fault
isolation, then a new subsystem fault isolation task is enqueued for execution.
The Second-Level Interruption Handler uses the test point identification as a
key to search the data base for the indication that special processing is required
for particular test points. In the interest of brevity, this is not shown in Figure
6-6. The most important type of special processing is the analysis to determine if
a caution or warning indication is required when the measurement is out of limits.
An example of other special processing is that used for certain Electrical Power
Subsystem test points which are measured repeatedly after the initial out-of-limit
indication. A fault indication is provided only if the measurement remains out of
limits for a pre-determined number of consecutive measurements.
6. 6. 2.2 Fault Isolation
When a fault is detected and has been verified by the limit check interruption
handler, the OCS Executive routine for fault isolation is given control. This is a
routine written in the high-level language which utilizes key test points and the con-
figuration data base to evaluate the performance of each Space Station subsystem,
and to determine which sequence of fault isolation programs should be utilized in
isolating the fault. Thus, the OCS Executive performs fault isolation at the sub-
system level.
Additional functions which support fault isolation are: loss-of-capability
analysis, GO-NO-GO processor,and the repair rate monitor. These functions are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
6.6.2.2. 1 Loss-of-Capability Analysis
The loss-of-capability function uses the configuration data base to determine
the relationship between an LRU failure and hardware functions and capabilities,
which are being-used-at-the-tine o-f-fail-e-. The -relati-onshi-p is-examined-with
regard to the effect of the failure on vital functions and capabilities.
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Figure 6-6. RDAU Second-Level Interruption Handler
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6. 6.2. 2.2 GO-NO-GO Option Processor
In order to permit the operator some flexibility in dealing with situations
where a reading is detected out of tolerance, the application program requires the
ability to respond to keyboard direction. Subsequent to detecting an out-of-limit
situation, a message is displayed and the program enteres the GO-NO-GO processor.
The available options are presented, the operator enters his selection, and program
to continue as if no error has been detected, to re-execute the part of the program
which detected the error, and to terminate the program.
6. 6. 2. 2. 3 Repair Rate Monitor
When a failure has been isolated, the actual remove and replace activity may
be delayed in order to optimize crew activities by having all such functions per-
formed according to a schedule. The repair rate monitor function serves as a log
to record fault incidences for use in scheduling activities requiring crew interven-
tion. A reminder feature is provided which acts to insure that a failure, once
detected and isolated, is not forgotten. Use of the Pacer is made to send a message
to the crew if action has not been taken within a pre-determined time interval.
Reminders may be rescheduled or cancelled by appropriate manual entries at the
display keyboard.
6. 6. 2. 3 Reconfiguration
The reconfiguration update utility program facilitates changing the configura-
tion tables of the data base to reflect changes to the configuration of the subsystems.
The utility also is used as a tool when establishing the configuration data base for
use by the fault isolation and operational procedures. This function has an extensive
interface with man, and is not intended to be used as a real-time update function.
6. 6.2.4 Trend Analysis
The trend analysis functions are implemented as a library of several different
types of routines which are designed to fulfill all trend analysis requirements of the
Space Station Subsystems.
The executive is involved in the following steps when a trend measurement is
required:
* The Pacer detects the need to perform a trend measurement
* Restart retrieves the last copy of working storage
* If the program is not already in storage, it is loaded
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- Control is passed to the program which makes the measurement, logs it,
and updates the working storage
* If the processing results dictate, crew communication is performed
* Checkpoint-and-terminate is invoked to save the updated copy of working
storage and relinquish processor control
For certain trend analysis applications, the data is merely stored for later
recovery and review. The trend data display function provides the means by which
man can retrieve trend data, and control the presentation of it in the form most
suitable for his purposes. Facilities are provided for processing the data in
tabular or graphical form.
6. 6. 2. 5 Program Verification Facilities
An important aspect of checkout which is too often overlooked is that of soft-
ware verification. The Executive services capability should contain sufficient
software verification techniques to determine the validity of the high-level language
test sequences in real time. A requirement further exists for a complete software
verification facility to be provided in a ground environment "Hanger Queen" to
perform checkout verification on both operational and checkout software.
The program verification facilities of the OCS Executive serve to provide an
interface with checkout programs indistinguishable from actual hardware, yet con-
trollable by man. The facilities use random number generation techniques to un-
predictably assume all possible situations which can arise from a given arrange-
ment of test points, so that program performance can be assessed rapidly and
without extensive time consuming breadboard techniques.
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Section 7
MAINTENANCE
There are two aspects of maintenance which entered into the basic study.
Basic maintenance concepts were provided as part of the baseline resulting from
the Phase B Space Station study; they are discussed in subsection 7.1 below.
Additionally, one of the study tasks was aimed at implementation of an onboard
electronics maintenance capability. The results of that task are summarized
in subsection 7.2.
7.1 BASELINE MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
Maintenance concepts defined for Space Station subsystems are intended to
facilitate their preservation or restoration to an operational state with a minimum
of time, skill, and resources within the planned environment.
7.1.1 GENERAL SPACE STATION MAINTENANCE POLICY
It is a Space Station objective that all elements be designed for a complete
replacement maintenance capability unless maintainability design significantly
decreases program or system reliability. This objective applies to all sub-
systems wherever it is reasonable to anticipate that an accident, wearout, or
other failure phenomenon will significantly degrade a required function. Estimates
of mean-time-between-failure, or accident/failure probability, are not accepted
as prima facie evidence to eliminate a particular requirement for maintenance.
Should the accident/failure probability be finite, the hardware is to be designed
for replacement if it is reasonable and practical to do so.
As a design objective, no routine or planned maintenance shall require use
of a pressure suit [either EVA or internal vehicular activity (IVA)] . Where
manual operations in a shirtsleeve environment are impractical, remote control
means of affecting such maintenance or repairs should be examined. However,
EVA (or pressure suit IVA) is allowable where no other solution is reasonable,
such as maintenance of external equipment.
Time dependency shall be eliminated as a factor of emergency action insofar
as it is reasonable and practical to do so. This includes all program aspects of
equipment, operations, and procedures which influence crew actions. When time
cannot -be el-i-m-inated as- a factor of emergency action, a crew convenience period
of 5 minutes is established as the minimum objective. The purpose of the con-
venience period is to provide sufficient time for deliberate, prudent, and unhurried
action.
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7.1. 2 ONBOARD MAINTENANCE FACILITY CONCEPTS
In addition to OCS/DMS capabilities, other onboard maintenance support
facilities provided on the Space Station include:
* Special tools for mission-survival contingency repairs such as soldering,
metal cutting, and drilling, as determined from contingency maintenance
analyses, although repairs of this type are not considered routine main-
tenance methods.
* Protective clothing or protective work areas for planned hazardous
maintenance tasks (such as those involving fuels, etc. ).
* Automated maintenance procedures and stock location data for both
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and repair activities.
* Real-time ground communication of the detailed procedures, update
data, and procedures not carried onboard.
* Onboard cleanroom-type conditions by "glove box" facilities compatible
with the level at which this capability is found to be required.
* Maintenance support stockrooms or stowage facilities for spares
located in an area that provides for ease of inventory control and
ready accessibility to docking locations or transfer passages.
7.1.3 SUBSYSTEM MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
Space Station subsystems utilize modular concepts in design and emplace-
ment of subsystem elements. Subsystem modularity enhances man's ability to
maintain, repair, and replace elements of subsystems in orbit. Providing an
effective onboard repair capability is essential in supporting the Space Station's
ten-year life span since complete reliance on redundancy to achieve the long life
is not feasible. The need for a repair capability, in turn, requires that a mal-
function be isolated to at least its in-place remove-and-replace level. The level
of fault isolation is keyed to the LRU, which is the smallest modular unit suitable
for replacement. The identification of subsystem LRUs is addressed as a
separate, but interdependent, part of the Onboard Checkout Study.
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Specific subsystem maintenance concepts, of course, depend upon examina-
tion of the subsystems. These concepts are discussed in subsequent subparagraphs.
General subsystem-related maintenance guidelines that have been established for
the Space Station are:
* It is an objective to design so that EVA is not required. However, EVA
may be used to accomplish maintenance/repair when no other solution
is reasonable.
* Subsystems will be repaired in an in-place configuration at a level that
is acceptable for safety and handling, and that can be fault-isolated and
reverified by the integrated OCS/DMS. This level of maintenance is
referred to as line maintenance and the module replaced to effect the
repair is the LRU.
* A limited bench-level fault isolation capability will be provided on the
Space Station, but is only intended for contingency (recovery of lost
essential functions beyond the planned spares level) or for development
purposes. Limited bench-level support is also provided in the form
of standard measurement capabilities which are used primarily to
reduce the amount of special test equipment required.
· Subsystem elements, wherever practical, will be replaced only at
failure or wearout. Limited-life items that fail with time in a manner
that can be defined by analysis and test will be allowed to operate until
they have reached a predetermined level of deteriorated performance
prior to replacement. Where subsystem downtimes for replacement or
repair exceed desirable downtimes, the subsystem will include backup
(redundant) operational capability to permit maintenance. Expendable
items (filters, etc. ) will be replaced on a preplanned, scheduled basis.
7.2 ONBOARD ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE (STUDY TASK 3)
The objective of this task was to generate recommendations of supporting
research and technology activities leading to implementation of a manned electron-
ics maintenance facility for the Space Station. Early in the task it became apparent
that attention could not be confined to a central maintenance facility; it was neces-
sary to refocus the task to address implementation of an on-board maintenance
capability encompassing in-place as well as centralized maintenance activities.
The critical questions are the following:
* What is the optimum allocation of onboard maintenance functions
between in-place and centralized maintenance facility locations?
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e What is the optimum level of onboard repair (i. e., to line-replaceable
unit, subassembly or module, piece part, or circuit element)?
7.2.1 MAINTENANCE CYCLE
In order to place the task in the proper context, a generalized Space Station
electronic maintenance cycle is depicted in Figure 7-1.
A convenient place to enter the cycle is with detection of a fault ("In-Place
Maintenance" block). The fault is isolated to a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). The
affected subsystem is restored to full capability by replacing the failed LRU with an
operable one from spares storage.
The failed LRU is taken to a maintenance facility (assumed for the moment
to have a fixed location in the Space Station) where it is first classified.as repair-
able or non-repairable. Classifications will likely be predetermined, and a listing
should be retained in the Data Management Subsystem. If the LRU is non-repairable,
it is placed in segregated storage. If the LRU is repairable on board, the fault is
further isolated to the failed Shop Replaceable Assembly (SRA). The LRU is then
repaired by replacing the failed SRA with one from spares storage. The repaired
LRU is then calibrated (if necessary), and its operation verified before it is placed
in spares storage.
Logistics requirements (replacement LRUs and SRAs needed) are transmitted
to ground-based logistics support functions by RF communications and/or Space
Shuttle. Failed units are taken away from and replacement units are delivered to
the Space Station by the Space Shuttle.
7.2.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The study confirmed and emphasized the necessity of onboard maintenance for
any manned mission of any complexity and duration measured in months (up to 10
years for Space Station). Formulation of recommendations for implementing such
a capability required consideration of other topics first, and achievement of
certain interim results. The principal conclusions of this study task are sum-
marized below. The analyses leading to them are explained in the Task 3 Final
Report.
* Prior studies and developments of in-space maintenance have empha-
sized justification of first-level (in-place) maintenance, fasteners, and
tools for space application and human factors criteria. Much less
attention has been devoted to test equipment, maintenance training, or
definition of shop level maintenance requirements.
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Figure 7-1. Space Station Maintenance Cycle
* The baseline subsystem descriptions, checkout requirements analysis,
and software requirements analysis indicate that approximately 60 per-
cent of all faults (over a long period) can be isolated to the failed LRU
automatically under software control, without crew intervention. In an
additional 27 percent of failure cases, fault isolation to one LRU can be
achieved by the crew using the onboard Data Management System as a
tool. In the remaining failure cases, additional fault isolation capabili-
ties are needed. This is a good result for a "first iteration" and can
probably be improved considerably with a modest effort to modify stim-
ulus and measurement provisions.
* Crew involvement in scheduled and unscheduled maintenance (including
participation in fault isolation) is estimated to average 7.2 manhours per
week over the total mission time. This estimate is most sensitive to
equipment reliability and levels at which onboard repair is performed.
It is affected little by the efficiency of automated fault isolation under
control of the Data Management Subsystem (DMS).
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* The recommended approach to maintenance in the baseline Space Station
is in-place removal and replacement of LRUs, without attempts to repair
LRUs onboard, if the resupply interval is less than nine months. Onboard
spares should be LRUs.
* For long resupply intervals or non-resupplied missions (as in a manned
interplanetary mission), in-place maintenance should be by removal and
replacement of LRUs. Repair of LRUs should be by removal and replace-
ment of Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRAs). Onboard spares should be
SRAs.
* The Earth-orbital Space Station should include provision for development
of onboard maintenance capability and techniques applicable to long dura-
tion non-resupplied missions and/or the larger, more complex Space
Base.
* The baseline subsystem descriptions are at such a level of detail that
precise specification of onboard tools and test equipment is neither
feasible nor desirable. Anticipated needs identified qualitatively in the
study are: (1) a portable test module to supplement software fault isola-
tion as well as to assist mechanical adjustments and calibrator, (2) hand
tools for removal and replacement of electronic assemblies, (3) devices
for transporting and positioning spare assemblies, and (4) a central
maintenance/repair bench.
* Several tasks have been identified and recommended for future perfor-
mance, as part of a system study/design program or as separate
supporting research and technology tasks. The principal ones deal with
(1) development of a portable test assembly, (2) development of a repair/
test bench with special provisions for small parts retention and for de-
bris collection, (3) design for accessibility of test points and subassem-
blies, and (4) devices for transporting equipment within the Space Station.
The foregoing conclusions apply to the Modular Space Station as well as the
33-foot diameter, four-deck configuration.
The results of the study rest upon several assumptions and estimates,
derived wherever possible from related experience. The results are not sensitive
to small variations of the assumed or estimated values, except for equipment fail-
ure rates, which are most influential. Furthermore, it has not been practicable to
pursue all trade analyses to include all relevant factors. Nevertheless, the study
has generated valid insights into Space Station onboard maintenance and useful
visibility of the path to implementation of that capability.
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